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The regional conference “Towards regional advocacy for cooperation in the Balkans via European best practices”  was organized on 0- March 009 (Tirana) from Institute 
for Democracy and Mediation in cooperation with the Albanian Parliament, Danish Embassy 
and partners from Visegrad countries – Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw (Poland), 
International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest (Hungary), EUROPEUM Institute 
for European Policy, Prague (Czech Republic), Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava 
(Slovakia).
The regional conference enabled a regional forum of consultations on the efficient 
instruments and European best practices of (non)institutionalized forms of regional 
cooperation from Visegrad, Nordic and Baltic countries. Experts from these regions have 
introduced their positions and discussed possible recommendations. This event gathered 
representatives from policy and decision making centers from Western Balkan countries 
such as Member of Parliaments, representatives of the diplomatic corps in Tirana, civil 
society experts, academia, think tanks, representatives of public institutions (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Integration, Ministry of Interior), international institutions etc.
The Regional Conference was intended to lead a process of enhancing regional 
awareness on the importance of (non)institutionalized regional cooperation caucuses 
in each of the countries in the region by offering selected examples of best practices of 
successful cooperation from the VISEGRAD, Nordic and Baltic countries, and draw joint 
recommendations on incentive cooperation agendas that would further provoke informed 
debate in regional countries.
 PREFACE
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This publication includes findings of the research and contributions of Visagrad partners’ expertise as well as other European best practices (Nordic and Baltic experience), and a 
summary of speeches held during the conference. In addition, it provides recommendations 
on how to move forward the agenda for further cooperation in the Western Balkans. IDM is 
very pleased to present this publication to the locals, Western Balkans, and other interested 
European parties.
Institute for Democracy and Mediation would like to express its gratitude to International 
Visegrad Fund and to Open Society Foundation for Albania (Soros Foundation) East East 
Program: Partnership Beyond Borders, to the Albanian Parliament and Danish Embassy, 
to its VISEGRAD and Western Balkan countries partners, and to all participants for their 
contributions to the success of this conference.
 CONFERENCE REPORT
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 INTRODUCTION
Mariola Qesaraku, Institute for Democracy and Mediation
Regional cooperation is a process that consents to various actors (governmental or not governmental) to engage in building networks of interdependence and common 
action in different fields ranging from security, economy, political, social, cultural spheres 
ect. Therefore, the nature of cooperation can be as broad as there are areas of governance 
and activities of actors. This process is in any region the result of the interaction between 
external and internal dynamics, where the former regards the outside environment/actors 
that facilitate and stimulate regional cooperation, whereas the latter refers to the existing 
willingness and ability of the regional environment/actors to identify mutual interests and 
convert them in common projects for the reciprocal benefit. Bearing this in mind, in the 
case of the Western Balkans (WB) regional cooperation has been a process mainly driven 
by actors from outside the Balkans, where the most important one has been the European 
Union (EU). After the violent break up of the former Yugoslavia, the international community 
has put a lot of efforts to stabilize and develop the region, thus constantly focusing on the 
enhancement of regional cooperation as one of the main processes of succeeding with this 
critical endeavor. 
In this aspect, the Stability Pact for South East Europe (SPSEE) initiated in 999 had 
the main objective to foster regional cooperation in economic, political and security terms. 
On this regard, SPSEE provided a significant contribution by offering a forum where WB 
countries and International actors could identify common problems of the region and 
formulate strategies to deal with them. Yet, the need for more enhanced regional ownership 
of its own affairs on regional cooperation, in order to reflect maturity of these countries, 
was felt as crucial. As a result, in February 008 it was launched the Regional Cooperation 
Council in light of promoting self responsibility with the main goal to stimulate regional co-
operation and bring the countries of WB closer to Euro-Atlantic structures.
 Western Balkans include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
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Nevertheless, regional cooperation has become a key element in the WB especially in the 
light of the Stabilization and Association Process launched by the European Union. One 
of the main requirements and prerequisites of Stabilization and Association Agreement 
for progress towards EU membership has been regional cooperation. EU has also made 
conditional economic and financial assistance to the WB, upon to their commitment to 
cooperate with one another. In the case of WB it can be assumed, that EU integration goes 
hand in hand with regional cooperation, and EU has been the main factor in stimulating 
regional cooperation in WB. All the WB governments are committed to EU integration, 
consequently EU has the leverage to foster cooperation among them. However, in order 
for the EU transformative power to be successful, it is indispensable that WB countries 
become key players and take ownership of this process. 
Despite the fact that some slow progress has been made from WB countries to improve 
inter-regional cooperation and endorse owned initiatives, cooperation has not reached the 
desired level, and single country approach to EU integration has prevailed. Additionally, 
cooperation has not reached yet institutionalized forms at all levels ranging from the Head 
of States, Prime Ministers, Ministers, caucuses at each of the national Parliaments of the 
countries in the region, etc. 
In the light of the great importance of regional cooperation for all WB countries, the 
Regional Conference organized by IDM intended to address key challenges of inter-regional 
cooperation in the WB through focusing on the instruments and promoting European 
best practices of (non)institutionalized regional cooperation forms - Visegrad, Nordic and 
Baltic countries - and challenges for the Western Balkans. More specifically, through this 
initiative, IDM intended to:
• To lead a process of initiating regional cooperation caucuses in each of the countries in 
the region;
• To offer selected examples of best practices of successful cooperation from the 
VISEGRAD, Nordic and Baltic countries;
• To enhance regional awareness based on jointly approved recommendations on incentive 
cooperation agendas that would further provoke informed debate in regional countries.
Consequently, the conference offered the best practices of cooperation from two regions 
comparable in a number of respects with the WB and more specifically Visegrad and 
Nordic regions. Similarities feature the communist past experiences, considering similar 
geographical proximity to Western Europe and analogous external orientations of their 
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political and economic elites toward EU. Countries of these regions have registered positive 
results, consequence of their regional cooperation, therefore lessons could be drawn by the 
comparison, but bearing always in mind differences with the WB.  
Additionally, the experience of the Nordic cooperation was introduced as an admirable 
practice of cooperation although the Nordic region has great differences with the Western 
Balkans. However, their experience could be useful in illustrating best practices especially 
in the field of education, environment, economic cooperation etc.  
It was important to include perspectives from different representatives from Western 
Balkan countries in order to better understand the challenges that these countries face on 
regional cooperation, how they perceive it, and also brainstorm on the best ways of adapting 
best practices from other regions to the Balkan reality on scenarios for future regional 
cooperation. 
Hence, this publication includes the research studies made by experts, thus  bringing 
best practices from their regions in order to learn both from positive but also negative 
experience in areas of shared values, cooperation content (cross border cooperation, Euro 
region, education) and institutional background (creation of institutions/caucuses/ forums 
which are permanent structures on regional cooperation). Additionally, recommendations 
regarding regional cooperation for the WB countries, jointly drawn on the conference by 
distinguished participants may lay down the basis for further action in enhancing regional 
cooperation.  
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In his opening address at the Regional Conference “Towards regional advocacy for cooperation in the Balkans via European best practices” , Sotiraq Hroni the Executive 
Director of IDM, showed his appreciation for the support given by the Albanian Parliament, 
the Danish Embassy and all partners from Visegrad and Western Balkan countries. He also 
expressed his gratitude to International Visegrad Fund and Open Society Institute (Soros 
Foundation) that made possible this Regional Conference with their support. 
Among other, in his opening remarks, IDM’s Executive Director explained the efforts to 
ensure participation also from representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Baltic 
Council (BC) as a functional experience of cooperation, especially related to its parliamentary 
dimension.  Mr. Hroni stressed the fact that practices of other regions, their achievements 
but also their failures can be very useful for the WB region, in the academic and practical 
level for encouraging a sustainable development of every kind of institutionalized form of 
regional cooperation.  
The initial idea of the conference was to encourage discussion on what can work best for 
the region based on experiences and lessons learned from other countries now integrated in 
the European family. In this framework, he believes that it is a responsibility of the countries 
of the region, the political elite and of intellectuals to offer instruments that from within, 
can attempt to approximate cooperation approaches and responsibilities thus building a 
new Balkan identity.   
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Western Balkans is not the same as it was one decade 
ago. It is not a region lacking of contacts, of missing initiatives, or the region in which the 
“language of hate” prevails, but on the other hand it suffers from prevailing lack of trust and 
 I. OPENING REMARKS
Sotiraq Hroni, Executive Director of IDM
TOWARDS REGIONAL ADVOCACY FOR COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS VIA EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES

willingness to cooperate. Regardless of progress made, there is a long way to success. It is 
obvious that regional relations and regional cooperation hardly appear as complimentary 
efforts to substantial political and social objectives for European integration in each of our 
societies. 
 For instance, although Albania’s role in the region has been considered by internationals as 
moderate and constructive during the last 0 years, this has appeared to be more as doing 
the homework required by the US and EU rather than as a well developed political vision. 
There does not exist a practice of the institutions or parliament in having ad hoc structures 
for the promotion, encouragement and sustainable support of inter-regional cooperation in 
coping with regional challenges. As a matter of fact, in Balkan countries it exists political, 
academic and media debate on issues related to integration process into NATO and 
European Union but there is not so much regarding the need for more regional cooperation 
in the Balkans. One year ago, a group of experts from the Centre for European Policy in 
Brussels suggested to the European Commission the Nordic model “Passport Union” on 
free movement of people, the Visegrad model of cooperation or of the Baltic Republic shows 
that it has been very useful and effective in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration processes.  
Finally, Mr Hroni referred to the main conclusion from an insight study of a group of experts 
of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Defense in Budapest. After studying thoroughly 
the main security documents and after an analysis through interviews with politicians 
and opinion-makers from all Western Balkan countries they arrived in the conclusion 
that regional relations of cooperation are guided from “No threat and No Trust” pattern 
bahaviour. Thus, the Western Balkan countries do not feel threatened from each other 
anymore, however they do not trust each other for cooperation. Everything expressed in 
the most important official documents on Foreign Policy of the Western Balkans countries 
for regional cooperation are “for pleasing internationals” and consequently “indicators for 
regional consolidation are in the most cases external”.  
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The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Neritan Ceka after welcoming all the participants on behalf of the Albanian Parliament expressed the willingness of the 
parliament to further contribute and to be a partner in this initiative but also in future 
projects, for strengthening regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. 
In this occasion he expressed his appreciation for such this initiative endorsed by Institute 
for Democracy and Mediation, its partners from Visegrad and the region, and the Danish 
Embassy in Albania for sharing best experiences of cooperation in the framework of 
integration processes. He also stated that western experiences would constitute a good 
example of regional cooperation and would encourage the Western Balkan countries as 
well in further deepening regional cooperation between each other. This activity which has 
involved representatives of the parliaments, the diplomatic corps and the civil society of 
the WB countries could constitute a new moment, in order to see and revaluate their level 
of cooperation through European best practices from members of the European Union and 
NATO. 
Our countries have embarked the irreversible journey of NATO and EU integration. In 
few days Albania and Croatia would be part of NATO. The other countries as part of the 
“Adriatic 5” are opening a new window of cooperation in the framework of integration in 
these structures. Although in different stages of integration, the WB countries have already 
decided their belonging to the EU family.          
Therefore, although cooperation has progressed there is a lot of work to be done and to 
benefit from other European experiences. The first decade of the new millennium offers a 
new Balkan reality. In a general plan, it coincides with the closure of old histories of inter- 
 wESTERN ExPERIENCES, USEFUL ExAMPLE OF 
REGIONAL COOPERATION
Neritan Ceka, Deputy Speaker of the Albanian Parliament
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ethnic tensions and the acceptation of a new political reality in the Balkan countries which 
has the main goal is to become as soon as possible members of the EU, in order to tear down 
the frontiers, by making sure that people and goods can move freely. 
In this framework, Mr. Ceka expressed his belief that contributions of the participants 
would come up with new ideas in the framework of a new institutionalization of regional 
cooperation. In this context, the parliaments of the region could in the first line to support 
initiatives on regional cooperation between governments and institutions in general. The 
Albanian Parliament is fully willing toward deepening regional cooperation and in the future 
would endorse concrete initiatives on this regard. 
Finally, he expressed his willingness to pay a particular attention to the recommendations 
drawn in the conference and call the attention of the Albanian parliament on this important 
issue not only for Albania but for the whole region.
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1. Cooperation 1990-2004
The idea of closer cooperation among the countries in Central Europe was formulated by 
trans-border meetings with dissidents from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East 
Germany. After the fall of communist regimes a potential alliance of Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary obtained a more realistic shape. All of these countries inherited similar 
problems, prepared crucial steps for political and economic transformations and tried to 
redefine their sovereignty towards both the disintegrating Soviet Union and the Western 
structures (institutions).
Multilateral informal discussions were initiated by Mr. Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovak president 
in April 990 which led to the signing of The Declaration on Co-operation of Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic, Republic of Poland and Republic of Hungary on the Way of the 
European Integration. This declaration was signed on February 5, 99, in Visegrad castle 
officially forming the Visegrad Three. Despite all of the problems with all three, respectively 
four countries successfully joined the EU in 004 and thus achieved the main strategic 
goal of the declaration.
The relevant obstacles appeared quite early after the signature of the declaration. The first 
one is connected with the split of Czechoslovakia in 99-99 which focused its energy 
primarily on internal issues in its own country. Nonetheless the peaceful process of the 
Czechoslovak divorce led to the transformation of the Visegrad Three to the V4. In spite of 
efforts of some neighboring countries to join the club in the nineties (Slovenia, Austria) the 
V4 has outlived without any statutory changes since 99. 
The second obstacle also stemmed from the former Czechoslovakia and is connected with 
 II. VISEGRAD COOPERATION: 
 BEFORE AND AFTER ACCESSION TO EU
Radomír Špok, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
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Mr. Vaclav Klaus and Mr. Vladimir Meciar. While Mr. Klaus, the Czech prime minister deeply 
mistrusted the V4 co-operation and was persuaded on exceptionality of the Czech Republic, 
Mr. Meciar installed a half-authoritarian regime in Slovakia which significantly broke some 
democratic principles and led the whole country into political isolation. After the changes in 
government in both Slovakia (Sep 998) and the Czech Republic (June 998), a new space 
for revitalization of the V4 co-operation has appeared. 
On October , 998, prime ministers of the V4 countries signed the Budapest declaration 
in which they re-endorse the V4 co-operation proclaiming integration into NATO and the EU 
as the main priority. Such a promise was aimed especially at Slovakia since the remaining 
countries were at that time partially integrated into NATO (officially March 4, 999) 
and even started the negotiations on accession into the EU (March 998). The effort of 
Slovakia to catch-up to the fellow countries was further stimulated by concrete steps, e.g. 
assistance of the Czechs concerning the harmonization of Slovak legislation in the first 
years of negotiations with the EU (provision of translations, consultations, etc). During 
the negotiations with the EU many people expected a closer co-operation among the V4 
countries, however no such relationship has materialized. The politicians were not able to 
define the lowest common denominative for the negotiations with the EU Commission and 
furthermore some sensitive internal political disputes appeared. The Czechs were offended 
by the statement of Mr. Viktor Orban – Hungarian prime minister on the potential revision 
of the Benes decrees (post-war presidential decrees regulating property rights and status 
of national minorities collaborating with the Nazi regime), and the Slovaks did not like the 
Hungarian act on rights of ethnical Hungarians living abroad (a relevant Hungarian minority 
live in Slovakia). 
In the period of 998 – 004 the Visegrad co-operation clearly showed the willingness 
of individual states to seek some concrete platforms for joint projects and actions but 
results have been very limited. Nonetheless, the establishment of International Visegrad 
Fund (see respective chapter bellow), the assistance to Slovakia in the negotiation process, 
regular meetings at different levels and the formation of several ad hoc committees can be 
considered as significant progress especially when compared with the situation in previous 
period (99 – 998). 
2. Perception of Visegrad cooperation by the citizens
Many analysts and political scientists say that the V4 is a good label with certain potential 
but so far with minimum real successes. Let us have a look at the V4 cooperation from 
the perspective of its citizens. The last detailed research on this issue dated in 00 
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comes up with the conclusions barely half of the V4 population has ever heard about the 
Visegrad cooperation and know what it is. Slovakia is the leading country ranking with 56% 
of citizens, followed by Hungary with 44% while Poland and Czech Republic are lagging 
behind with 9% and 5% respectively of the population. 
On the other hand Poland is the country where 4% of population has never heard about 
V4 compared with Hungary (9%), Czech Republic (9%) and relatively well informed 
Slovakian public (9%). One of the factors which can determine the Slovak orientation 
towards the V4 group is a delay of this country with the accession to both the EU and NATO. 
While the other countries joined NATO in 999, Slovakia, which had to survive the mid-
nineties under the government of controversial Mr. Vladimir Meciar, received the invitation 
in 00. A similar delay threatened the negotiations with the EU but thanks to successful 
catch-up process in Slovakia this country has joined the European Union together with their 
fellow V4 countries. 
The second question which should be examined is the sense of V4 cooperation. Having the 
question “Is the cooperation among the V4 countries still important, and does it still have 
a mission to fulfill?” It is again in Slovakia where people trust this regional cooperation the 
most (75%) while the Czechs are the most indifferent (46%). Here it is necessary to mention 
the legacy of nineties in the Czech domestic policy led by the current Czech president Mr. 
Vaclav Klaus. He has never been keen on Visegrad cooperation and in his speeches he often 
emphasized the uniqueness of the Czech Republic, its social and industrial development 
and considered the Czech Republic to be primus inter pares when talking about the political 
and economic transformations and memberships in European and transatlantic structure.
Citizens find different reasons why the V4 countries should cooperate. In most of them (SK, 
PL, HU) an aspect of geographical position prevailed followed by common history and effort 
to join the EU. For the Czechs it is a common history that seems to be a main argument for 
mutually beneficial cooperation.
Content of V4 cooperation is the last but not least factor which the respondents were 
questioned. The data is quite similar for all V4 countries maybe with an exception of 
Hungary where 46% of citizens saw a joint effort to join the EU as the main raison d’etre of 
V4 cooperation. Besides, cultural exchange, foreign policy and internal security (e.g. crime 
prevention, police cooperation) have been mentioned often, but there are no doubts that 
majority of people (65% in HU; 6% in SK) perceive the economic cooperation as the most 
appropriate content of cooperation.
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3. Trade inside the V4
Have the expectations of citizens relating to the economic cooperation as the main priority 
of V4 cooperation been fulfilled? The first criterion for assessing this question could be 
the foreign trade inside V4 countries demonstrated by the data provided by the Czech 
Statistical Office. According to them the Czech export to the remaining V4 countries has 
increased by % (from 0 bil. CZK in 99 to 49.5 bil. in 007), but is still lower than 
the overall Czech export growth in this period (488%). This, at first glance lowers the focus 
on the trade inside the V4 has been to some extent caused by the existence of Czechoslovak 
federation and relatively intensive business links in the year when the independence of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia were declared (99). 
On the other hand the trade between Czech companies and the Polish and Hungarian 
counterparts has incredibly boosted. While the volume of Czech export to Poland was 
roughly  bil CZK in 99 (% of overall Czech export) fourteen years after it exceeded 
47 bil CZK (5.9%) which is more than ,5% growth! The case of Hungary is similar with 
almost 800% growth of Czech export to Hungary. As for the import of goods to the Czech 
Republic the picture is more or less the same as the export data. Generally in both export 
and import criteria Slovakia and Poland are ranked second, and third place respectively, of 
all the trade partners (just behind Germany).
It is interesting to watch the data of mutual trade with regards to the EU accession. Between 
00 (a year before the EU membership) and 007 the growth is enormous; the Czech 
export has doubled towards Slovakia and showed even higher boost in relation to Poland (by 
4%) and Hungary (by 48%). Apart from the EU which has lifted all remaining barriers 
in mutual trade this steep growth of trade inside the V4 region was caused by relatively 
high economic growth of the whole Central Europe (with some reservation in the case of 
Hungary) especially by automotive industry which became an important cluster with many 
suppliers and producers benefiting from reasonable distance and good infrastructure in the 
trans-border regions of the V4. 
Good and intensive business contacts can also be demonstrated on some concrete examples 
of trans-border mergers inside the V4 region. There are two areas where such enhanced 
cooperation is seen quite well – energy and petrol industries. (There are many more cases 
but the above mentioned sectors are the only ones where domestic capital and national 
owners prevail). The petrol business is represented by two mergers (Hungarian MOL with 
Slovakian Slovnaft and Polish PKN Orlen with the Czech Benzina company). In the energy 
sector it is especially the CEZ - Czech company producing and distributing electricity which 
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has purchased a couple of power plants in Poland, is now preparing to build two new natural 
gas power stations in Hungary and cooperates on building up a nuclear power station in 
Mochovce, Slovakia. It is not possible to say that such intensive business cooperation has 
started thanks to the V4 (more likely thanks to the EU and process of globalized capital) but 
in any case it contributes to better visibility of Central European countries strengthening its 
identity.
4. Institutional structure
Since the beginning, the Visegrad cooperation has been based on intergovernmental 
cooperation and individual projects without any permanent institutional structure. There is 
no secretariat, no official acting on behalf of the V4 group. This is the significant difference 
from other regional cooperation scheme, e.g. Benelux has its own General Secretariat, 
Nordic Council has even the Secretary General representing the whole regional group of 
countries.
The practical political life of Visegrad co-operation is framed by the meetings on various 
levels. While the regular meetings of prime ministers or presidents are the most visible many 
other sessions on lower levels (ministers, deputy ministers, and special envoys) take place 
during the year. Since 998 several commissions and committees were established dealing 
with economic trans-border criminality, preparations for the Schengen treaty, international 
terrorism, cultural and scientific co-operation. Most of the outputs arising from these 
meetings were limited on ad hoc basis reflecting the topical needs. 
Regardless of some political statements of V4 leaders at the various summits, there is a 
minimum chance to push ahead any further institutionalization of Visegrad co-operation. 
The only institution which has ever been established in the framework of V4 is the 
International Visegrad Fund. 
5. International Visegrad Fund (IVF)
IVF was founded on June 9, 000, by the decision of the governments of Slovakia, Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. The main goal of this fund is to promote closer cooperation 
among the V4 countries through supporting educational, scientific and cultural projects. 
This fund concretely supports the exchange of young people, cross-border cooperation and 
tourism.
The yearly budget of IVF is 5 million Euros and each member country contributes by one 
quarter. The governing bodies of the Fund are the Conference of Ministers of Foreign 
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Affairs and the Council of Ambassadors. The executive body of the Fund is composed of the 
Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director. The administrative body of the Fund 
is the Secretariat.
The Fund provides support through four grant programs, three scholarship schemes and 
artist program. Among the recipients of the Fund’s support are mainly non-governmental 
organizations, municipalities and local governments, private companies, schools and 
universities and individual students and artists.
The overall expenses for the above mentioned programs have increased from 406,6 
EUR in 000 to 4,066,57 EUR in 007. The content of the support has also significantly 
developed; while in 000 there was only one grant program supporting in total 6 projects. 
In 007 IVF offered five schemes (small grants, standard grants, strategic grants, 
scholarships and artist residency) which contributed to 768 projects. The distribution to 
individual countries seems to be a sensitive political issue and that is why it is as equal 
as possible (e.g. in 007 the biggest recipient – HU – .5%, the smallest recipient PL 
– 0.84%). In 007 over 4% of total IVF budget was distributed for the project outside 
the V4 countries (Ukraine, Austria, Romania, etc.).
It is clear that the IVF has become an important donor for many organizations in the region 
which is one of the most visible outputs of Visegrad cooperation. 
6. Cooperation after accession to the EU
On May , 004, the general objective of the Visegrad declaration from 99 has been 
achieved when all V4 countries joined the European Union. Therefore at the prime minister 
meeting in Kromeriz on May , 004, a new declaration was signed defining the new 
goals of this regional cooperation. The prime ministers agreed that further cooperation 
of V4 countries would have to continue inside the European Union with overall goal to 
strengthen the Central European region. Such cooperation should remain flexible, open 
without building up an institutional structure and based on concrete projects. The efforts 
of neighboring countries to join V4 or some particular projects (Austria, Slovenia) were 
also reflected in this declaration stating that V4 countries are ready to closely cooperate 
with their nearest partners. The only specific content of V4 cooperation which is explicitly 
mentioned in the declaration is a joint conviction that the European Union should remain 
open for further enlargement. Thus, V4 countries began to assist the countries aspiring for 
the EU membership, especially in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. 
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Eastern dimension of the EU and the Eastern partnership approved by the European council 
in June 008 is really one of the areas where no particular obstacles can be found. All the 
V4 countries have some national interests in helping countries in Eastern and South Eastern 
Europe which arise either of close business links (Polish-Ukrainian border, investments in 
SE Europe) or ethnical minorities (Hungarians in Serbia and Croatia). 
Certain cooperation among the V4 countries has been expected even before the EU accession. 
During the negotiations with the EU some tendencies to coordinate the positions of V4 
countries have appeared but were never realized. The European Commission continuously 
persisted to negotiate with the candidate countries on a bilateral basis creating a strong 
constraint for any joint action.  Mr. Jan Kohout – Czech representative in the Convention on 
the Future of Europe remembers that some common initiatives were produced but in the 
end all efforts failed. Unfortunately, the current situation five years after the EU accession 
has not distinctively improved. Co-operation in the European parliament and the Council has 
not gained any concrete shape; there are no regular consultations among the V4 countries 
on a joint position or voting. Furthermore the individual V4 state pragmatically creates ad-
hoc coalitions with like-minded partners instead of long-term strategic partnership inside 
the V4.  Let us try to have a look at the issues which are potentially overlapping in national 
priorities of the Visegrad countries.
. National protectionism, barriers at common market – economies of all four countries 
are very open and heavily pro-export oriented. Therefore they are very sensitive on 
any mentions, heard sometimes from the Western fellow countries, on dangers of 
delocalization and social dumping in CEE countries. The motto of the Czech presidency 
“Europe without Barriers” could be easily acceptable for the whole V4.
. Transatlantic relations, Security and NATO – all V4 countries emphasize the necessity 
of transatlantic relations for security not only in Europe but all over the world. Poland 
and Czech Republic are probably the loudest advocates of EU – US ties, and the treaties 
on radar and missile basements as a part of anti-missile shield are the best evidence for 
this argument. The Iraqi crisis and Mr. Donald Rumsfeld division of Old and New Europe 
also confirmed the different perspectives of Central European states to global threats.
. Eastern partnership and further enlargement – for the whole V4 group it is a crucial point 
as it has been seen from the Kromeriz declaration (004) as well as practical steps of 
political representations. Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic strongly concentrate on 
Western Balkan countries and support the EU enlargement (original plan of the Czech 
presidency counted on ending the negotiations with Croatia by June 009). Poland 
promotes the development of relations with Ukraine and Belarus since it is important for 
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both economic and security reasons. 
4. Energy policy – a indispensable policy for energy stability of the V4 especially after the 
gas crisis in the beginning of 009. All these countries intensively lobby for the Nabucco 
gas pipeline and more funds for trans-border connections of pipeline networks which 
could prevent the possible drop-out in power supply. In January 009 the citizens of V4 
witnessed a nice example of V4 solidarity when the Czech Republic provided Slovakia 
with its natural gas reserves and Hungary declared the readiness to deliver electricity to 
Slovakian network if needed.
5. EU budget, EU Cohesion Policy – all V4 countries are net recipients from the EU budgets 
and they rely on funds from the EU Structural funds to develop their economies. This 
area might become a suitable platform for co-operation in the EU relating to upcoming 
financial perspective 04 – 00.
 
While the above mentioned issues can be considered as opportunities there are in any case 
the areas in which no co-operation can be expected. The first of them is the Euro – a single 
European currency which has been already adopted in Slovakia, Poland officially states 
to be ready for adoption in January 0 while the Czech Republic hesitates to come up 
with a clear decision and Hungary does not fulfill any of the four main Maastricht criteria. 
Any consensus could be hardly found in the reform of Common Agriculture Policy (too 
different agricultural sectors, e.g. in CZ and PL), minority protections (sensitive issue of 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia) or institutional structure of the European Union itself. In the 
latter question the size matters and V4 countries differ significantly. Poland is ambivalent 
between acting as the biggest of the small countries or the smallest of the big countries 
(together with GE, FR, IT, UK and ES), Hungarians and Czechs are ranked among the mid-
sized countries and Slovakia is even smaller. The size of the country manifests nicely in the 
discussions on institutional settings in the EU Commission (one country – one commissioner 
principle) and the Council (Qualify Majority Voting).
7. Conclusions
In 004, the Visegrad co-operation achieved the original goals, i.e. accession of its members 
into NATO and the European Union. From this perspective the V4 can be assessed very 
positively. On the other hand the expectations of some politicians and citizens were a bit 
higher and have not been realized. The concrete co-operation froze right at the beginning 
and had to be revitalized in 998. Nonetheless, even the public support of closer Visegrad 
co-operation is quite considerable. In the past the V4 showed no real political concessions, 
bargains or trade-offs inside the Visegrad partners towards the EU. A couple of practical 
steps must be appreciated, e.g. establishment of International Visegrad Fund, assistance 
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to Slovakia during the negotiations with EU and solidarity at times of energy crisis.
It seems that businessmen are again one step ahead the politicians. Macroeconomic 
analysis of data relating to mutual trade convincingly shows the steep boost of both export 
and import of goods inside the Visegrad Four. Does it mean that business is able to perceive 
the opportunities better than politicians do? Functioning clusters of automotive producers 
and their suppliers (textile, plastic industries, etc.) is a nice example of how the whole 
of Europe has been integrating since the fifties. Reflection of Karl Marx’s politics in the 
superstructure of economy seems to be in this context correct.
Generally, there are only a couple of practical achievements of Visegrad co-operation and 
for many people it lagged far behind the expectations. On the other hand Visegrad remains 
a valuable label in international politics with its potential hidden itself.
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 III. THE ROLE OF THE VISEGRAD COOPERATION IN 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND COORDINATION OF 
FOREIGN POLICIES AMONG ITS MEMBERS
Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, Institute of Public Affairs
1. Visegrad sub regional cooperation as a community of values
The experience of the formation, crisis and redefinition of the Visegrad Group as a voluntary 
form of sub regional integration serves to underline several lessons pertinent to questions 
of conflict management and dispute resolution. The Group’s success in maintaining a 
fundamentally unified foreign policy course, culminating in the eventual accession of all 
four countries to Euro-Atlantic structures, confirms the significance of political resolve and 
consistent adherence to the declared orientation for maintaining the steady political course. 
The role of the Group as a community of values was demonstrated in the case of Slovakia 
when the Meciar administration was ostracized not only among Western politicians but 
also in the Central European forum. The Group’s cohesion, challenged by the disintegration 
of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak-Hungarian conflict and differences over relations of some of 
its members to the largest regional powers, Germany and Russia, has been maintained, and 
the constellation remains one of the few recognizable and lasting subregional initiatives in 
the region.
The effectiveness of the Group in containing conflicts is rarely remembered, probably as 
it relied on the ‘soft’ instruments, typical of a club or association, rather than elements of 
direct pressure on one of its members. The initiative is unique in the East European region in 
its origin as a voluntary group of states, which unilaterally stated their common aspirations 
to re-integrate with the Western European structures at the time when the West was still 
uncertain as to the feasibility of this undertaking. The fact that the initiative came from 
the states of the region themselves, and was not a project imposed from outside, had an 
important aspect of building the image and reinforcing own commitment by referring to 
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certain self-adopted standards. In a way, the Visegrad experience served as an ‘ante-room’ 
of NATO and the EU, socializing the members in practicing the discourse of self-restraint, 
compromise and pursuit of own interests within the bounds of common welfare. When 
viewed in this context, the ‘peaceful divorce’ between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
the bumpy but eventually resolved issue of the rights of minorities between Slovakia and 
Hungary and the gradual warming up of relations and adoption of common stance in key 
security and foreign policy issues between the former rivals, Warsaw and Prague, must be 
seen as successes, which could only be possible within the larger sub regional framework. 
The low level of institutionalization and emphasis on values in foreign policy were signs of 
deliberate abandonment of the principles of real politik, spheres of influence and forced 
subordination of national interests to supranational structures, reminiscent of the Cold 
War divisions and the Warsaw Pact/Comecon political and economic deep integration. 
From the perspective of the time, it is astounding that the states, which had just regained 
independence and enjoyed individual choice in foreign policies, were willing to declare 
common foreign policy course as early as in 99. Two factors may be credited with this 
willingness. The first was the shared heritage and worldview of the ruling elites--the 
governments in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw all had roots in the dissident pro-democracy 
movements of the 970s and 980s, which declared the primacy of human rights (including 
minority rights), rescinded the use of force in international relations and had strong 
mandates for democratizing reforms. The second was paradoxically the uncertainty of the 
international environment—a ‘power vacuum’ emerged with the withdrawal of the Soviet 
troops from Central Europe, and the new continental order was still unsettled with the 
Central European states apprehensive of the consequence of the reunification of Germany 
on the one hand and the disintegration of Yugoslavia on the other. Thus, the elites of the 
region were brought closer together both by the commonly shared ideals and visions of 
politics and by the perception of looming threats in the international scene.
It may be asked why the Central European sub regional initiative was not replicated in the 
other parts of the post-Communist world (with the exception of the Baltic states)—in 
particular, the CIS and the Western Balkans. A crucial factor was the intellectual debate 
preceding the systemic transition—Kundera, Konrad and Michnik ‘rediscovered’ the common 
Central European identity and historical heritage by reinterpreting the national histories so 
that the narrow nationalist discourses were largely abandoned in favor of the more inclusive 
concepts of ‘civil society’, ‘self-government’ and multinational federalism (especially in the 
Polish context). The ‘Central European idea’ was far more than an antiquarian intellectual 
exercise in which the medieval unity of the region overshadowed the conflicts of the modern 
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era—in the hands of the democratic opposition to authoritarianism it became a foundation 
of a new political environment, which valued and strengthened the local cross-border ties, 
acknowledged the position of minorities and reestablished the status of several regions as 
multiethnic communities. To the first-generation Central European democratic governments, 
the axioms of permanence of state borders in Europe, guarantees of ethnic minority rights 
and the preference for voluntary association as a form of integration, were significant in 
themselves as radical departures from the nationalist slogans of the Communist leaders 
and important safeguards against the traumatic experience of the WWII-period ethnic 
cleansing, resettlement and redrawing of the borders (again, most poignant in Poland).
Analysts often pointed to the lack of political interest on the part of the elites and the revival of 
exclusive nationalist identities as main barriers to lasting sub regional integration in the CIS 
and the Western Balkans. However, an element that has been present since the beginning 
of the 990s in the Visegrad sub region and has been missing in the other two sub regions 
was the consensus on the shared values and a joint resolve to adopt a single geopolitical 
orientation, both of which transcended the individual interests and mutual animosities. Of 
course, it should also be noted that among the members of the group there is no country, 
which would attempt to lead the integration efforts by subordinating the interests of the 
other partners—in fact, it is notable that even Polish politicians acknowledge that the oft-
used term “regional leader” represents only Poland’s ambition to generate enough interest 
among the other members of the group so that they would rally behind Warsaw on specific 
items of the agenda. The Visegrad Group represents a compromise—the individual states 
of the group are not powerful enough to play the role of regional powers, and at the same 
time the open character of the cooperation, lacking coordination mechanisms, and largely 
limited to issuing declaratory statements, allows the states to differ in the issues with 
genuine conflicts of interest.  
 
2. Limitations of the model
Siedschlag (00) points to interplay between the dynamics of EU and NATO accession and 
the willingness of Central European states to institutionalize their cooperation within the 
Visegrad Group. The constellation initially served its purpose of creating a common identity, 
setting the three (and soon, four) countries apart from the more unstable and unpredictable 
area of the CIS, and adding credentials to the declared course of Euro Atlantic integration. 
However, by mid-990s the success of the enterprise, evident in the adoption of the 
term ‘Visegrad states’ in the diplomatic parlance, was generally taken for granted as the 
individual member states of the Group began pursuing unilateral strategies for accession 
into the EU.
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The original rationale for forming a sub regional group that of establishing an acknowledged 
community of stability, unified in its pro-Western course ceased to motivate the members 
for collective action by the late 990s. The four countries could not agree its foreign policy 
activities in two fundamental areas: the strategy of accession to the EU and the priorities 
in relations with countries of CIS – primarily Russia and Ukraine. These divisions partly 
reflected genuine differences of national interests and domestic priorities, and partly were 
influenced by the external pressures limiting the policy options of respective countries. 
As Wyciszkiewicz argues in his overview (00) of the policies of the Visegrad states 
towards Ukraine, the cooperation within the Group did not override or even weaken the 
fundamental disparities in the countries’ foreign-policy interests and strategies. The 
limited impact of the regional process on the member countries’ policy decisions became 
most visible in the period between the accession to NATO (999) and EU (004). The 
differentiated approach to candidates for accession into those two organizations, which 
was demonstrated in the exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of NATO accession 
and the temporary division of EU candidates into two groups, was a powerful incentive 
for competition among the countries of the region for playing the role of a ‘leader’ in the 
transition and accession processes. 
The EU accession process served to reveal rifts among the countries, creating in the 
capitals of the states a perception that the sub regional cooperation might be actually a 
liability rather than an asset for realizing vital national interests. This can be illustrated by 
comparing the Czech and Polish foreign policy priorities, which clashed in the run-up to 
EU accession—for different reasons, both countries felt that reaching consensus within 
the group was unrealistic or even counterproductive. The Czech Republic opposed further 
institutionalization of the sub regional cooperation as it was interested in joining the EU 
as fast as possible, even if that meant leaving one or two of the members of the group 
temporarily behind. In turn, the Polish approach stressed the importance of maintaining 
good-neighborly relations with Ukraine, which had by then achieved the position of a 
‘strategic partner’ in Eastern Europe for Poland. Behind these two approaches lay the two 
different philosophies of ‘Westernization’—if for the Czech Republic, stressing the distance 
from the rest of Eastern Europe was vital for securing its national interest of anchoring 
the country in Western structures, for Poland, the development of model relations with the 
countries in direct eastern neighborhood was seen as a confirmation of Warsaw’s status as 
a regional leader.
Questions arose over the added value of the Visegrad cooperation once the participating 
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states acceded to the EU (Bukalska 004, Kroslak 007, Rusnak 004). It was asked, 
for instance, whether the Group was not obsolescent as a forum of consultation given the 
fact that the governments could rely on the established and much stronger coordination 
mechanisms in the EU. Also it was questioned whether the V4 states needed to stress its 
unique configuration after becoming part of the larger community of liberal democracies. 
The Ukrainian electoral crisis and Orange Revolution of 004 made it clear, however, that 
the emphasis on values and the idea of solidarity with pro-democracy movements, shared 
by the V4 states, remained distinctive elements of the Visegrad identity. The configuration 
remained attractive not so much as an institutional setup as an example of successful 
democratic transformation for the other parts of the post-Communist world. At the same 
time, the experience of subsequent years calls for the reassessment of the often-accepted 
maxim of the Visegrad cooperation as a model for other sub regions in Eastern Europe. 
3. Lessons for other subregions
As noted above, the Group has been an unquestioned success in the realization of its 
primary objective, that of reinforcing the credentials of its members as aspiring members 
of the club of Western liberal democracies. The term “Central Europe” synonymous with 
the rule of law, political and economic stability, respect for minority rights and peaceful 
resolution of conflicts gained such currency that by now it helps disguise the diversity 
among its members in their economies and political systems as well as downplay the 
persisting interstate conflicts. The current economic crisis is actually the first occasion on 
which, for instance, the Polish or Slovak governments chose to distance themselves from, 
for instance, Hungary, undergoing severe fiscal problems, preferring to portray themselves 
as ‘islands of stability’.
Secondly, unlike the sub regional initiatives in the Western Balkans (initiated externally, see 
Muě 008) and the CIS (promoted by an unquestioned regional leader, Russia), the Group 
by design has lacked an ‘integrating centre’. Its integration model could be described as a 
narrow consensus limited to issues where the states either had shared interests or held 
few reservations. The Group steered away from ambitious projects and over the years has 
remained a high-level consultation forum, which occasionally issued joint declarations on 
issues of common interest. This approach paradoxically ensured the Group’s survival for 
nearly two decades now—the constellation did not derail on any single issue and remains 
as recognizable in the radically different environment of the late first decade of the twenty-
first century as it was in the beginning of the 990s.
Such low level of institutionalization may be sustained for three reasons. Firstly, the mission 
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of the Group embodies deep elite consensus on the principles of interaction between states 
and respect for human rights (including minority rights), which serves as the yardstick 
against which the performance of individual governments may be measured (as in the case 
of the Meciar administration). Secondly, the institutional framework for dispute resolution 
is found in the international forums, to which all the member states belong—the Council of 
Europe, NATO and the EU. Thirdly, the Group has stable membership and the mere fact of 
the continued functioning of the configuration adds to its symbolic capital—in other words, 
the member states have realized some of the benefits of cooperation, and take advantage of 
the value of this reputation for stability and anchoring in the Euro Atlantic institutions not 
only as individual states but as a sub region as well. However, it may be asked whether the 
Visegrad Group would have survived without stronger coordination mechanisms if it was 
not for the eventual integration into NATO and the EU. While the Group was not established 
by the West, the promise of entry into the club of Western democracies exerted primary 
influence over the foreign policy courses of the individual Visegrad states, especially in the 
run-up to NATO and EU accession. In fact, the states of the Group could be much more 
interested in closer integration in selected areas, where the EU is not ready to step in as a 
whole yet. Some initiatives appeared already, such as solidarity in energy policy (advocated 
by Poland) or common approach to promoting democracy in Ukraine. At the same time, 
while the V4 remains a recognizable bloc, it is unlikely that the differences in foreign policy 
strategies, which remain considerable, are going to be bridged any time soon. Hence, 
‘coalitions of the willing’ (as that of Poland and Lithuania or Hungary and Slovenia) are 
certainly going to be necessary preconditions for effective lobbying for a given issue at the 
V4 forum.
As a result, the utility of the Visegrad model of cooperation is limited for other subregions 
in the post-Communist world. Firstly, it presupposes the genuine commitment to a single 
geopolitical orientation and pre-existing fundamental consensus on the principles of 
state coexistence. This capital of domestic political culture was not available in the other 
subregions at the time. Secondly, the Visegrad ‘label’ was quickly accepted by Western 
states and institutions, so that the V4 countries soon received the benefits of cooperation 
in the form of reputation as stable democracies and prospective members of the Euro-
atlantic community. In contrast, over time it became evident that the reaction of the West 
to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was inadequate, and by the end of 
the 990s it provoked strong disappointment among the few intellectuals and politicians 
who had hoped for the Western assistance to democratic regimes at the beginning of the 
990s. Finally, an important difference between the Visegrad states and the successor 
states to the USSR and Yugoslavia was the consolidated national identity (at least in 
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Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) and existing state structures of the Visegrad 
countries, which served as the necessary institutional framework for cooperation.
At the same time, the low level of institutionalization and emphasis on shared values has 
helped establish a community, which may become attractive to some states in the other 
sub regions once they also take advantage of the stability attributed to the prospects of 
accession to NATO and the EU. If one were to think of a possible scenario for the Western 
Balkans, the ‘Visegrad’ model could be applied as a form of trust-building among states, 
which are resolved to pursue the same accession path, and are willing to demonstrate their 
solidarity in selected issues of common interest. While this form of voluntary sub regional 
community-formation lacks own strong enforcement mechanisms, it may provide a 
component that is much needed to provide impetus for accession—creating a new identity 
and establishing the norms, characteristic of a security community of liberal democracies.
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 IV. VISEGRAD COOPERATION: LESSONS LEARNED 
AND THE wAY FORwARD
Franc Kalmar, International Centre for Democratic Transition, Hungary
“Since 1991 the close cooperation of the 
core Central European countries has been a 
cornerstone for stability in the post-Cold War 
period Europe. It can and it should serve as a 
model for other groups of states with strong 
historical and geographic connections.”
H.E. Mr. Géza Jeszenszky, former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite, or rather thanks to the ongoing 
global crisis, and the growing recognition 
that global trans-national challenges 
require wide coalitions, there is historic 
momentum toward cooperation in and 
among our regions, in Europe, and globally 
as well. To be effective, cooperation has 
to be framed by common interests and 
focused on concrete issues to deliver results. This paper is an attempt to apply this simple 
statement to the history and achievements of Visegrad cooperation. Besides the immediate 
objective at hand, documenting this story is also an expressed objective of the International 
Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT), a non-profit democracy assistance NGO based 
in Budapest, Hungary which collects the experiences of recent democratic transitions 
and shares them with those who are determined to follow that same path. Instead of 
promoting democracy in general, the ICDT sets more concrete and pragmatic goals. One 
of the Centre’s program areas is ”Interregional Cooperation”, i.e. promoting interregional 
cooperation between governments and civil societies of neighboring countries to enable 
democratic transition. An ongoing program titled “Transferring the Experiences of Visegrad 
Cooperation to the Western Balkans and the GUAM Countries”, a  year flagship project 
also has a similar aim. ICDT launched this project because there are important similarities 
between the situation of the Visegrád countries in the not-so-distant past and that of the 
countries of the Western Balkans today. 
The Visegrád Group was formed in part to pursue the same strategic goal of integration 
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into Euro-Atlantic structures that now figures at the top of the foreign policy agendas of 
Western Balkan countries. In the case of the Western Balkans, the articulation of such a 
dimension to serve as a framework for strengthening regional cooperation is even more 
important than it was for Central Europe. First, it is an explicit condition for advancing 
towards EU integration. But even more importantly, regional cooperation also sends the 
implicit signal that the consolidation of Western Balkan democracies permits them to 
transcend old divisions to work towards a new, common goal. That is why we believe it 
matters that consistent efforts take place to study and apply the lessons of V4 cooperation 
in the Western Balkans. At the same time, contributing to the stability of the region is an 
important issue for Hungary and its Visegrad partners, and it makes sense to use the V4 
framework in this regard. Specifically, the paper tackles the issue in three parts:
• It briefly sketches the history of Visegrad cooperation (something that as a Hungarian 
one also feels compelled to do); 
• It offers an analysis of some of the ”lessons learned”, which may actually be too 
ambitious an expression: collection of experiences is perhaps more appropriate as these 
experiences need time and historical perspective to mature and be instilled into real 
”lessons learned”; 
• It offers some thoughts on the way forward in utilizing the potential of the Visegrad 
format, especially as applied to the specific themes and topics discussed at the 
conference.
2. V4 HISTORY
Originally, Visegrad cooperation was born at a royal summit of the kings of Poland, Bohemia 
and Hungary in the Hungarian castle of Visegrad on the Danube in 5. In the early 990’s, 
it was not clear to anyone, not even in West, what the New Europe would look like. It was 
a common interest though to ensure that a democratic society was firmly established not 
only in the individual countries concerned but in those of the neighbors as well. Also, new 
cooperation was made easier by years of personal contacts between dissident movements 
and despite many historic differences, the three founding Central European countries were 
all post-communist states closest to each other in wider Europe in terms of historical 
and cultural ties, level of economic and social development, way of thinking founded on 
many a shared historic turbulence (that famous if somewhat abstract spirit of ”Central 
Europe”), and opposition to the Soviet system. This was then the foundation reflected 
in the Visegrad declaration of 99 that called for full restitution of state independence, 
democracy and freedom, and Euro-Atlantic integration. The fields of cooperation selected 
were rapprochement with European institutions, economic cooperation, infrastructure 
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development, free flow of information, civil society’s cooperation and people-to-people 
contacts. 
At same time, the participating states made it clear that they were not aiming to create a 
new bloc per se, if only because many in West were proposing Central European cooperation 
as a substitute for structural integration into Western Europe. This is the early, inherent 
contradiction of V4 cooperation that is still with us today. Still, the fact that three (later 
to become four and Visegrad Group with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech 
Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, and the Slovak Republic) Central 
European countries were able to demonstrate an aptitude for multi-tiered cooperation was 
one of the main factors that led to their being the first post-communist states to join the 
process of European integration. According to Jirí Dienstbier, former Czechoslovak Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, ”The United States and the European Community saw in our activities 
an assurance that there would be stability in Central Europe, and a gradual widening of 
the zone of democracy and freedom to the East. (…) Today the issues are different than 5 
years ago, but the cooperation of Visegrad countries continues to be a guarantee of regional 
stability.”  Today, European Commission President reflects on the origins and added 
value of Visegrad cooperation in the following way: ”From the start, the aim of the group’s 
founding members was to strengthen stability in Central Europe. By successfully meeting 
the challenges of this cooperation, the Visegrad Group members helped equip themselves 
and each other with the attributes necessary for successful integration into the European 
Union. Even today, the Visegrad Group see themselves as completing and reinforcing the 
work of existing structures in Europe, both at the EU and transatlantic level.”  So, what 
exactly is Visegrad Cooperation?
. Structure and development of V4
The Prime Ministers’ Summit in Bratislava on 4 May 999 approved the following contents 
of Visegrád cooperation: 
 2.1.1 Substantive elements of the co-operation:
Foreign affairs:
• Consultations and issuing, as and when the need arises, of joint statements on issues of 
common interest, regular meetings of V4 ambassadors;
• Regular meetings and consultations of experts (on bi-, tri-, or quadrilateral basis):
 Dienstbier, Jirí: Visegrad - The First Phase, www.visegradgroup.eu/ essays & articles
 Barrosso, José Manuel: Is Visegrad Regional Cooperation Useful for the European Union? www.visegradgroup.eu/ 
essays & articles
 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=94&articleID=97&ctag=articlelist&iid=
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exchange of information on long-term strategies and concepts of foreign, security and 
defense policy, exchange of views on the stability and security of the Central and Eastern 
European region, 
o exchange of information and consultation on particular regional crises, 
o transfer of experience on the preparation for NATO membership and on the NATO 
accession process, possible areas and forms of co-operation to support Slovakia´s 
ambitions for accession, 
o transfer of experience on the theme of the communication strategy and methods 
relating to NATO and EU (PR aimed at the public at large), 
o transfer, on a mutual basis, of experience on EU integration (exchange of 
experience and information on positions in preparing for accession negotiations and 
implementation of acquis, consultations on securing of the Pre-accession funds /
SAPARD, ISPA, etc./). 
Internal affairs (co-operation in border and immigration affairs in the context of EU accession 
(consultations on the Schengen agreement and related issues, harmonisation in combating 
illegal migration, illicit drugs transport and distribution, weapon smuggling, organised crime 
and terrorism (exchange of views in process of preparation of legislation in this area); 
Education, culture, society, youth and sport; Science and technology;Environment;Infrast
ructure (for example, exchange of information on long-term infrastructure strategies and 
projects, discussions on and co-operation in diversification of energy supplies); 
Cross-border co-operation (for example, use of Pre-Accession Funds, information and 
recommendations for joint participation in the EU programmes, participation in and creation 
of horizontal community programmes, use of PHARE projects in the case of cross-border 
programmes, exchange of experience, drafting of joint studies). 
. The structure of the Visegrád intergovernmental co-operation:
• Prime Ministers’ meetings with a coordinating chairmanship on a rotating basis (in the 
order Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia), mandate for one year, once a year 
an official meeting in the chairing country, once a year an unofficial meeting. The main 
topics to be covered were listed as state of the co-operation, EU accession talks, and 
strategic questions facing Central Europe;
• Meetings of other Government members as and when the need arises on particular 
questions in charge of corresponding ministries;
• Meetings of State Secretaries of Foreign Affairs twice a year on preparation of prime 
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ministers´ meetings, working out draft recommendations for the tactic and strategy to 
be pursued in the co-operation;
• Regular Ambassadors’ meetings - format 4x + authorities of the hosting country, and 
in the chairing country at least 4 times a year on state of Visegrád co-operation;
• Meetings of Visegrád coordinators twice a year, as and when the need arises, alternately 
in the four countries, on reviewing and co-ordinating the co-operation, preparation of 
the state secretaries´ and prime ministers´ meetings.
Furthermore, it was foreseen that ”the Visegrád co-operation will not develop only between 
the governments, but also other forms of co-operation will be encouraged, such as the 
meetings of the heads of state, the regular communication between the parliaments, the 
intensive contacts between “intermediary bodies” of civil society, etc.”
3. International Visegrad Fund
From the declaration above, it becomes clear that Visegrad is not an institutionalized form 
of regional cooperation per se, with no standing institution. The exception as the only 
integrated V4 institution is the International Visegrad Fund: an international organization 
based in Bratislava, founded by the governments of the countries of the V4 on June 9, 
000. The purpose of the Fund is to promote development of closer cooperation among 
V4 countries (and other countries) through the support of common cultural, scientific and 
educational projects, youth exchanges, cross-border projects and tourism promotion. The 
budget of the Fund (EUR 5 million since 007) consists of equal contributions from the 
governments of V4 countries. The Fund provides support through four grant programs, 
three scholarship schemes and artist residencies. Among the recipients of the Fund’s 
support are mainly non-governmental organizations, municipalities and local governments, 
schools and universities, but also private companies and individual citizens. The governing 
bodies of the Fund are the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of 
Ambassadors. The executive body of the Fund is composed of the Executive Director and 
the Deputy Executive Director. The administrative body of the Fund is the Secretariat.4
4. Guidelines on the future areas of Visegrad co-operation
Following EU accession, one of the main purposes of cooperation, to advance together 
toward Euro-Atlantic integration, was completed. This had a fundamental impact on V4 
cooperation and demanded a reappraisal of the purposes of cooperation. According to the 
Declaration in Kroměěíž on  May 004, future cooperation would be developed particularly 
in the following areas: 
4 www.visegradfund.org
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4. Co-operation within the V4 area:
• Culture;
• Education, youth exchange, science;
• Continuation of the strengthening of the civic dimension of the Visegrad co-operation 




• Fight against terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration;
• Schengen co-operation;
• Disaster management;
• Exchange of views on possible co-operation in the field of labor and social policy;
• Exchange of experiences on foreign development assistance policy;
• Defense and arms industries.
4. Co-operation within the EU:
• Consultations and co-operation on current issues of common interest; 
• Active contribution to the development of the CFSP, including the “Wider Europe – 
Neighborhood” policy and the EU strategy towards Western Balkans;
• Consultations, co-operation and exchange of experience in the area of Justice and 
Home Affairs, Schengen co-operation, including protection and management of the EU 
external borders;
• Creating new possibilities and forms of economic co-operation within the European 
Economic Area;
• Consultations on national preparations for joining the EMU;
• Active participation in the development of the ESDP, as a contribution to the 
strengthening of relations between the EU and NATO and deepening of substantive 
dialogue between both organizations.
4.  Co-operation with other partners:
• Co-operation with interested Central European countries;
• Co-operation with EU and NATO candidate and aspiring countries in support of reforms 
essential for their European and Euro Atlantic perspective;
• Collaboration in effective implementation of programmes of co-operation of these 
countries with the EU and NATO;
• Co-operation with other regional structures; 
• Collaboration with other interested countries and organisations.
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4.4 Co-operation within NATO and other international organisations: 
• Consultations and co-operation in the framework of NATO and on its defense 
capabilities;
• Commitment to strengthening of transatlantic solidarity and cohesion;
• Co-operation on the basis of the V4 experience to promote a common understanding of 
security among the countries aspiring to European and Euro Atlantic institutions;
• Enhanced co-operation within the international community in the fields of new security 
challenges, with a special emphasis on combating international terrorism;
• Consultation and co-operation within the OSCE on issues of common concern for V4 
countries; possible joint initiatives;
• Consultation, co-operation and exchange of information in international organisations 
(UN, Council of Europe, OECD, etc.); consideration of possible joint initiatives,
• Possible mutual support of candidacies in international organizations and bodies.
4.5 Mechanisms of co-operation
 Governmental co-operation: 
• Rotating one-year presidency, each chairmanship prepares its own presidency 
programme ensuring, among others, continuity of a long-term V4 co-operation;
• One official Prime Ministers summit a year at the end of each presidency; 
• Occasional informal meetings of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers before 
international events;
• Deputy foreign ministers meetings preceding the PM official summits;
• Meetings of other ministers in V4 and V4+ format;
• Intensified communication of V4 national co-coordinators and their key role in internal 
and inter-state co-ordination;
• Consultation and co-operation of Permanent Representations to the EU and NATO in 
Brussels, as well as in all relevant fora (OSCE, UN, CoE, OECD, WTO, etc.).
• International Visegrad Fund and its structures.
•  Meetings of Presidents of V4 countries;
• Co-operation of Parliaments of V4 countries.
4.6 Joint Statement of Prime Ministers, Warsaw, November 008:
This meeting is an example of the wide-ranging interests and activity of Visegrad Group, 
with a variety of economic and international political issues on the agenda:
• The Prime Ministers will consider the proposal of the Slovak Republic to establish 
Visegrad Development Bank to stimulate the regional cooperation in strategic projects 
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financing (i.e. in energy sector);
• The Prime Ministers consider important that the particular energy supply security 
situation of the Central and Eastern European Member States should be reflected within 
the second Energy Strategy Review as well as in the second Energy Policy Action Plan;
• the Prime Ministers declare their support for the Czech Presidency initiatives aiming 
at intensifying the relations with the countries of the Caspian Sea region and transit 
countries;
• The Prime Ministers expressed their belief that EU will accomplish the necessary balance 
between both--the Eastern and the Southern--dimensions of European Neighborhood 
Policy. The Prime Ministers expect suitable EU’s financial measures, essential for an 
effective implementation of Eastern Partnership;
• Expressed support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty as well as Ukraine’s 
pro-European policy and support for Belarus’ visa regime simplification.
4.7 Multilateral formats, V4+
Of particular relevance in terms of V4 cooperation with neighboring regions is the V4+ 
formula, that has seen the establishment of relations with such diverse partners as Japan, 
and cooperation with other regional structures such as the Nordic Council and Benelux 
Cooperation. The Regional Partnership with the participation of Austria and Slovenia led to 
the creation of Budapest Forum in 005. The Forum’s objective was to help the European 
integration of Western Balkan states, with each RP country partnering up with a Western 
Balkan peer to provide targeted sectorial assistance. 
4.8  ‘Ups and downs, twists and turns’
The development of Visegrad Group (VG) political cooperation took place along the 
interaction of two variables:
• Domestic Politics
For example, problems in establishing closer cooperation were caused by two politicians, 
Czech PM Vaclav Claus, a skeptic of VG and controversial Slovak PM Vladimir Meciar, 
and this interlude led to a near death of Visegrad. However, in 998 VG experienced a 
breakthrough, when both PMs left office and their successors were capable of restarting 
cooperation. In 00, VG suffered a similar crisis following the official reopening of the 
case of Benes decrees by Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán. 
• International Context
A further wave of skepticism following the waves of 999 NATO/004 EU enlargement and 
the completion of the original ”raison d’etre” of Visegrad cooperation emerged: will central 
Europe survive as a political idea or will it be limited to cultural nostalgia? The year 004 
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was not only a period in which the integration ambitions of the visegrad countries reached 
a peak, but it was also, in metaphorical terms, a year of growing visegrad skepticism. The 
reasons for this doubt lie in fears that visegrad cooperation would become irrelevant with 
the entry of these countries to the EU and the completion of their main mission, as well as 
fears that visegrad would disintegrate within the more heterogeneous environs of the EU. 
Still, Visegrad cooperation persisted as a reference point in Central Europe: “Visegrad is 
integrally linked to the term Central Europe. While other institutions and initiatives were 
founded in this region after 989 and bearing some variation of the label “Central Europe”, 
Visegrad was exceptional. While the Central European Initiative (CEI) now numbers 7 
member countries, including Italy, Albania and Belarus, and the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) has Romania and Bulgaria as active members, the number of states 
participating in Visegrad cooperation - apart from following the breakup of Czechoslovakia 
- has not changed. The Visegrad Group - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia 
- actually forms a common base for CEI and CEFTA, along with other regional initiatives.” 
5Rather, integration with NATO and the EU required that the Visegrad countries define new 
goals. It remains a desirable goal for the term Central Europe to be a synonym for progressive 
ideas that could turn heads in Brussels and in some of the older member countries.
5. BALANCE SHEET
Why is regional cooperation important? In a wider sense, in diplomacy, form is also important 
not just substance. Habits and informal channels built as a result of regular cooperation are 
useful in times of crisis as a mitigating factor. ”Regional cooperation is at its very foundations 
halfway between domestic and foreign policy. Only strong, well established societies could 
afford to keep solidarity and make commitments in seeking higher benefit from wider 
cooperation in non-zero sum game of regional cooperation. Visegrad is an attractive label in 
international relations mainly because of the potential hidden in the process itself.”6 As we 
have seen, in the great best practice of regional cooperation that is the EU or NATO, V4 is 
an important mosaic.
Cooperation is therefore important; however, a fundamental but none the less true factor 
is that it is determined by political will. In turn, political will is shaped by certain structural 
factors.
5. Factors reinforcing Visegrad cooperation:
• Groups of countries have larger potential to influence decision-making than individual 
5 Duleba, Alexander, Tomáš Strážay: New Chances, New Challenges, www.visegradgroup.eu/ essays & articles
6 Urban Rusnák: Is There Any Future For Visegrad Cooperation Within The EU? www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/
EPF_future_of_Visegrad.pdf
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states;
• The V4 countries have – broadly speaking – a similar geopolitical position;
• the Visegrad Group may develop common policies regarding the European Neighborhood 
Policy and towards Russia;
• The V4 countries – except perhaps the Czech Republic -- have special interest in 
diversifying their energy supplies; a North-South gas pipeline might contribute to such 
an effort (LNG from the Adriatic and Norwegian gas from the North though the latter 
supplies are running out);
• ’Interreg’ cooperation’s are promising forms of overcoming ethnic suspicions and 
sensitivities; 
• Certain power centers (especially the U.S.) encourage V4 cooperation for geopolitical 
and geo-strategic purposes;
• Schengen: the Visegrad Group should have a close cooperation in border security related 
issues (as three of them are so-called external border countries);
• Joint expeditionary capabilities may be developed/strengthened (e.g. existing Czech-
Slovak battle groups in the EU);
• Common policies regarding raw material security may be explored; 
• Environmental protection;
• Civil society cooperation; 
• Cultural cooperation;
• Strengthening the only existing Visegrad Group institution, the International Visegrad 
Fund (current annual budget is 5 million €).
5. Factors mitigating against closer cooperation among the Visegrad countries:
• Foreign policy strategies may not mesh: 
• Poland is thought to try to play the role of a regional power and the others are not willing 
to support this goal; Warsaw is much more concerned with security issues in the Baltic, 
Belarus and Ukraine than the others; Poland has taken a much stronger interest in the 
political outcome in Ukraine and Belarus than the others; Poland is more worried about a 
potential German-Russian cooperation over the head of the V4 than its partners; 
• The Czech Republic does not seem to be so keen on the V4 cooperation than the others 
because substantial segments of the Czech political life thinks the V4 is more a liability 
than an asset; Prague currently is much more Eurosceptic than the others; 
• Slovakia and Hungary have serious conflicts regarding the treatment of the Hungarian 
minority in Hungary; Pozsony (Bratislava) tends to be more understanding concerning 
Russian policies in Central Europe than, e.g., Warsaw;
• Hungary’s policies in Central Europe are partly dictated by the presence of Hungarian 
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minorities in a number of neighboring countries, therefore, Budapest’s interests seem to 
be strong in the Western Balkans and in Southeast Europe – areas, which are generally 
not priorities for the other V4 states; Budapest has already experimented with a 
promising East-West cooperation in the form of the Little Danube cooperation (Baden-
Württemberg-Bavaria-Austria-Hungary); another potentially promising strategic 
dimension for Hungary would be a Southwest orientation (Croatia-Slovenia-Italy); the 
other V4 members have not taken a strong interest in both of the latter initiatives;
• There are fears that a strong V4 cooperation would reinforce the perception of these 
countries as EU periphery, while the national strategies aim at belonging to the core;
• The economies are not really complementary: except for the Czech Republic the others 
are still relatively strong in agriculture (remember, e.g, the Polish-Hungarian conflicts 
over Hungarian food export to Poland a few years ago);
• One potential source of friction is still the question of the Benes Decrees between 
Hungary on one hand and the Czech Republic and Slovakia on the other one (though this 
issue is currently in the backburner).
6. Some lessons learned and best practices
 According to Urban Rusnak, former executive director of the IVF, the following conclusions 
can be drawn from VG history:7 
• The simple truth is that the identification of the appropriate content for cooperation is a 
crucial first step;
• All the more so, as too high expectations raised can harm common interests if tangible 
results are then not delivered;
• Common goals must be tailored to existing mechanisms and vice versa. As perhaps the 
single most important Visegrad ”best practice”, the IVF was successful as a flagship of 
Visegrad because the appropriate legal framework was created, sufficient administrative 
capacity invested in, a regular financial flow assured and, perhaps just as crucial, 
operations were channeled to fields relatively independent of political debate;
• Solidarity is not a given, all should create and cultivate it: when any of the countries asks 
for joint V4 support for particularly sensitive question, partners evaluate such proposals 
exclusively in light of their interest, nothing like broad trade-off mechanism exists in 
V4;
• For working solidarity and for solidarity to work, mutual trust and well identified clear 
goals are among first conditions;
• Confidence building should start with technical issues with immediate impact, which is 
necessary for cumulative growth of positive experiences. Public support is a function of 
7 Urban Rusnák: Is There Any Future For Visegrad Cooperation Within The EU? www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/
EPF_future_of_Visegrad.pdf
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real efforts, not of empty declarations;
• Sharing Euro-Atlantic integration experience was also a particularly successful example 
of cooperation best practices: for example, in the case of Slovak preparation for NATO 
accession sharing Hungarian expertise had an important value added
• The V4 could not in the short run could not deal with highly politicized questions. 
7. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Despite the scepticism that has arisen in periods of ”near death” and in the wake of the 
completion of Euro-Atlantic integration of the members, Visegrad has survived, and will 
continue to function due to a critical mass of centrifugal forces grouped along the points 
outlined above. In particular, the future of Visegrad can be analyzed in relation to the  
aspects below:
. Best practices, which in general have to do with the political will to cooperate and 
sectoral results and initiatives;
. Projecting stability and promoting the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans 
and the Eastern Neighborhood, in particular through the Regional Partnership/Budapest 
Forum;
. Developing a common VG platform on democracy assistance.
Furthermore, the following points seem particularly relevant in terms of Visegrad’s future: 
• Effective cooperation at the regional level is an excellent way to reinforce the efficiency 
and proximity of action taken at the EU level. The International Visegrad Fund (IVF), 
with its support for cultural, scientific and educational projects, exchanges between 
young people, crossborder cooperation and tourism promotion, is a very good example of 
the regional dimension reinforcing initiatives at the European level;
• As a form of regional cooperation, Visegrad can function effectively within the EU only 
as long as it complements other cooperation platforms and processes for deepening 
European integration. At the same time, it can serve as inspiration for other models 
of regional cooperation in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The unique geopolitical 
situation at the outset of the 990s, when Visegrad was founded, together with the 
economic situation in individual countries, their cultural similarities and common past 
to a certain extent makes Visegrad a unique entity that cannot be reproduced in other 
conditions, but this is not true of select aspects of Visegrad cooperation. Apart from 
regular high-level political meetings, the deepening of mutual contacts at the regional 
level and support for cultural, especially educational projects, are all worthy of emulation. 
Much can also be learned from the mistakes of Visegrad, especially the period when 
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developments in the Visegrad Group came into conflict with undesirable domestic 
political developments in individual countries.8 
• The countries of the West Balkans, thanks to their more clear prospects of EU 
membership, are closer to the Visegrad model than the states of Eastern Europe. In view 
of the proliferation of regional initiatives, however, the thought of founding a new form of 
regional cooperation as a type of “Balkan Visegrad” seems undesirable. A more practical 
solution would be for the most viable of the existing regional initiatives to import know-
how and experiences from Visegrad through meetings or working groups. In doing so 
they would not only help themselves, but they would also allow the Visegrad model to be 
tested out. A common approach by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in 
the creation of the EU’s eastward foreign policy, and any aid they gave to the integration 
ambitions of the Western Balkans, could give Visegrad cooperation another lease on 
life.9 
• In particular, the Regional Partnership Budapest forum can be a suitable format and 
venue to realize such an objective, with Western Balkan integration now competing 
for attention in Brussels with the Lisbon treaty and the economic crisis. Resusciating 
cooperation to share integration experience in such a platform could help to keep the 
process going and serve to reassure the countries concerned and assuage fears of being 
left behind;
In terms of forming a V4 platform on democracy assistance, the following ideas seem 
particularly worthy of further consideration and high-level political attention:0
• V4 democracy assistance programmes should encourage co-operation between V4 civil 
society and target-country NGOs by funding projects that incorporate the participation 
of a V4 partner, but do not require the V4 partners to be the lead, or the participation of 
at least three V4 partners (as in the case of the International Visegrad Fund);
• The V4 countries should significantly improve the co-ordination of their democracy 
assistance programmes, and set up a joint Visegrad Democracy Fund either in individual 
countries or in regions, such as the Western Balkans;
• Visegrad governments should coordinate more on funding, and engage in common 
advocacy at the Brussels level to strengthen EU policies towards the Eastern neighbors 
- and the implementation of those policies;
• The role of the V4 embassies in promoting democracy should be given more prominence, 
and should be strengthened in future democracy assistance policies of the V4.
8 Duleba, Alexander, Tomáš Strážay: New Chances, New Challenges, www.visegradgroup.eu/ essays & articles
9 Duleba, Alexander, Tomáš Strážay: New Chances, New Challenges, www.visegradgroup.eu/ essays & articles
0 New Kids on the block: Can the Visegrad Four emerge as effective players in international democracy assistance, 
PASOS Policy Brief No. ., 008
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8. Conclusion
• Success depends on a clear vision, consensual goals and the appropriate mechanisms 
for delivery;
• Cooperation should concentrate on regional issues with practical impact for the domestic 
constituencies/electorate;
• Future political statements should not exaggerate the real potential of V4.
The history of Benelux and Nordic cooperation shows that we have to ready for backsliding, 
but efforts must be sustained for decades to bear their fruits.
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 V. STRENGTHS AND wEAKNESSES OF VISEGRAD 
MODEL IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPING REGIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE wESTERN BALKANS
Tomas Strazay, Slovak Foreign Policy Association 
This article considers regional cooperation to be an important and integral part of the process of European integration. It is divided in three major parts. The first part evaluates 
the ability of the Visegrad cooperation to serve as an effective instrument of solving 
problems and fulfilling common goals of the V4 countries both in the pre-accession and 
post-accession periods. The second part focuses on the documents and guidelines, which 
are framing the activities of the Visegrad Group. Thirdly, advantages and disadvantages of 
the weak institutionalization of the V4 are considered. 
1. Visegrad Cooperation as an Instrument of Meeting Common Challenges
A short insight to the history of the Visegrad cooperation shows that the V4 became a well-
established trademark both in Brussels and Washington, D.C. In the 990s the Visegrad 
Four was a synonym of stability and prosperity in otherwise unstable post-communist 
world. Though later on the V4 had to overcome several critical moments and in the period 
99 - 998 the Visegrad cooperation was even suspended, the achievement of the most 
crucial goal - the integration of all four countries to NATO and European Union - can be 
considered as a  great success of individual countries, but also a great achievement of the 
Visegrad Group as a whole. 
Even though the Visegrad countries have recently had certain difficulties to find a set of new 
priorities that would be comparable to the EU and NATO accession, it can be argued that 
the Visegrad cooperation still presents the most effective model of regional cooperation 
in Central Europe. In fact, during the negotiation process with the EU the Visegrad Group 
became a strategic platform for exchange of views and coordination of activities. This, 
however, does not mean that the V4 countries were always loyal to the interests of their 
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partners in the group. Even in the end of 00, during the final phase of negotiations with 
the European Union each of four countries fought for its interest alone, forgetting about 
solidarity within the group. Similar situation repeated one year later at the Brussels Summit 
of the European Union. Though the membership in the EU brought the V4 additional 
opportunities to enhance cooperation, the V4 countries continued to have different views 
on couple of issues, including the Lisbon Treaty, anti-missile defense or, last but not least, 
the independence of Kosovo. 
The diversity of views on particular issues, however, cannot overshadow the successes of the 
Visegrad Group both in the pre- and post-accession periods (e.g. CEFTA, Schengen, etc.). 
On the contrary, it highlights the importance of the V4 as a platform for exchanging views 
and discussing common interests. Another characteristic feature of the V4 since the very 
beginning is the maintenance of high flexibility on the one hand and weak institutionalization 
on the other. The forthcoming paragraphs of the analysis not only describe main documents 
framing the activities and areas of interests of the Visegrad cooperation, but their main 
focus is on the advantages and disadvantages of the weak level of institutionalization of 
the Visegrad model.  
2. Framing Documents and Guidelines
The ability of the Visegrad Four to face effectively common challenges is to a large extent 
derived from the set of documents, which are framing activities of the Group and are 
defining the role of particular stakeholders. The Visegrad cooperation is based on quite 
a limited number of such documents – two general declarations, two sets of guidelines 
plus one supplement to these guidelines. This, however, implies that a large portion of the 
success of the V4 relies rather on other factors than strict rules and rigidly defined modes 
of conduct.  
The first declaration establishing the Visegrad Group was signed by the representatives of 
the “Visegrad-Three” (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland)  in 99 in Visegrád, Hungary. This 
declaration set up basic goals of this regional initiative and created the basis for further 
development of joint activities, including “the full involvement in the European economic 
and political system”. After the revitalization of the cooperation in 998, the prime misters 
of the V4 countries agreed on the Contents of Visegrad cooperation, which were approved in 
Bratislava in 999. The Contents included substantive elements of the cooperation in eight 
areas – . foreign affairs, . internal affairs, . education, culture, society, youth and sport, 
 Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic 
of Hungary in Striving for European Integration, 99, www.visegradgroup.eu.
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4. science, technology, 5. environment, 6. infrastructure, and 7. cross-border cooperation. 
Another important element of the Contents was the description of the structure of the 
Visegrad intergovernmental cooperation, as well as the involvement of other stakeholders, 
including parliaments and civil society organizations. The role of the presidency of the 
Visegrad group was defined in the annex to the Contents. The rotating presidency was 
supposed to intensify the cooperation and concentrate it on a few priority areas. Main areas 
of cooperation in the post-accession period were then identified in the so-called Kromeríž 
Delaration (004) and attached Guidelines on the future areas of Visegrad co-operation 
(004).4 The latter also described more precisely the mechanisms of cooperation while 
mentioning specific role of meetings of presidents of V4 countries and cooperation of 
parliaments. 
Both Visegrad declarations and sets of guidelines assign the most important role to the 
governments of particular countries, while presidents and parliaments are supposed to play 
only secondary role. Nevertheless, there exists a list of meetings of parliamentary committees 
of the Visegrad countries, or meetings of the presidents of the parliaments. Other parts 
society, including academic institutions, cultural institutes or NGOs, are supposed to be 
involved in cooperation mostly through activities of the Visegrad Fund. Though there is a 
systematic effort to bring Visegrad closer to citizens, the V4 remains to be predominantly a 
political project, whose attractiveness in the population still remains limited.
3. Institutional Background: advantages and disadvantages of the weak 
institutionalization 
Declarations and sets of instructions create only necessary background for regional 
initiative, while its efficiency is based on the willingness of involved countries to participate 
equally in the cooperation, as well as on effective coordination of their standpoints and 
activities. Another task, however, is to evaluate what institutional background is necessary 
for maintaining cooperation sustainable and efficient. The Visegrad Group as such does not 
have any institutional background in the form of secretariat, through which the activities of 
the group would be managed. The only Visegrad institution remains to be the International 
Visegrad Fund, which is, however, to a large extent an independent entity focusing on the 
support of joint projects in the field of culture, education, exchange of students and scholars, 
 Contents of Visegrad cooperation, 999, www.visegradgroup.eu.
 Annex to the Content of Visegrad Cooperation, 00, www.visegradgroup.eu.
4 Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak 
Republic on the Cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the European Union, Guidelines 
on the future areas of Visegrad co-operation,  004, www.visegradgroup.eu.
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cross-border cooperation or tourist promotion.5 The low level of institutionalization has 
both advantages and disadvantages, which can be summarized as follows: 
Advantages: 
• flexibility and openness to new ideas and contents  
• more efficient spending of financial resources
• high importance of the principle of solidarity
• possibility to organize ad hoc meetings and coalitions with other countries 
Disadvantages: 
• lack of a single coordinating body 
• lack of strictly defined communication procedures and mechanisms of cooperation  
• decisions are not legally binding 
• difficulties with building the so-called Visegrad identity.
There is a consensus in the Visegrad Group not to enlarge the group and not institutionalize 
it beyond the level of the International Visegrad Fund. This mean that there is political will 
to maintain regional cooperation mostly as an informal  platform for discussions on various 
political issues on the level of prime ministers, other government members, state secretaries 
of foreign affairs, ambassadors, Visegrad coordinators, presidents etc. On the other hand, 
the increased budget for the IVF and its support from the governments of V4 countries, 
steadily growing number of applications for grants, as well as rising number of awarded 
scholarships – also for students from non-Visegrad countries, the Western Balkans included 
– prove that the importance of the IVF for the V4 is crucial. 
Nevertheless, the history of the Visegrad cooperation shows that regional initiative can be 
viable and efficient also when maintaining quite weak institutionalization. However, this 
assumption is valid only if there exist values, principles and informal rules, which are shared 
by all partners. One of the most important among them is the principle of solidarity. Despite 
the above mentioned divergences in positions of particular V4 countries, solidarity has 
remained to be the leading principle in the Visegrad Group. It also has to be underlined that 
the building of regional cooperation goes hand in hand with establishing a well-recognized 
regional “trademark”, with a positive connotation abroad. In this field the V4 may serve 
again as a really good example. Finally, another predisposition for a viable regional initiative 
remains an appropriate selection of common goals and aims, which are to be achieved.
5 The International Visegrad Fund was established in on June 9, 000 and is based in Bratislava. The budget of the 
Fund (EUR 5 million since 007) consists of equal contributions from the governments of the V4 countries. The 
Fund provides support through four grant programs, three scholarship schemes and artist residencies. Among the 
recipients of the Fund’s support are mainly non-governmental organizations, municipalities and local governments, 
private companies, schools and universities and individual students and artists.
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 VI. ROLE OF BALTIC COOPERATION TOwARDS THE 
REGION AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION  
Elira Hroni (MA), University of Bologna
1. Historical background of the Baltic Cooperation (its founding, institutions, 
and objectives)
It is interesting to note that cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania restarted at 
end of ‘80 as a reflection on most encouraging historical dates of past trilateral cooperation 
(“Treaty on Concord and Cooperation” signed in Geneva on September , 94), and based 
on the presumption of agreeing on common goals and to work out a platform for mutual 
co-operation with the aim of regaining independence while dissolving of Soviet Union, and 
counting on Western support to those objectives.
Institutionalized cooperation started in May 989 in Tallinn where the Assembly of the 
Baltic Independence Movements was formed, and few months later the Baltic Council  
with a broader participation of ministers, members of parliaments, academics, and activists 
of social movements who supported the independence of these countries.  Within such 
contexts regular meetings took place, in which the internal political situation of three 
countries were discussed and analysed, a strategy to co-ordinate contacts between 
the Baltic republics and Western European countries was elaborated, coordination and 
experience was shared for their top agenda of national independence movements. 
With the view to develop a joint concept concerning the economic independence of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania and the minimisation of their economic dependence on the USSR 
on April  990 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed an agreement on economic co-
operation; thus constituting the Baltic Co-operation Council with the Baltic Co-operation 
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of the republics. It had committees representing various sectors and  working groups 
representing the main areas of co-operation (financial policy, industry, agriculture, etc.).
On May 4 990 the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia issued an appeal to the 
deputies of supreme councils of two other Republics urging them to begin trilateral 
negotiations as soon as possible concerning conclusion of a political intergovernmental 
agreement and co-ordination of economic and foreign policy activities. This appeal led to 
the signing on  May 990, of the Declaration of Unanimity and Co-operation  as a renewal 
of the Treaty signed by the Baltic States in Geneva on  September 94. The issued 
Declaration included a provision that a Baltic States’ Council (that terminated its activities 
in 99) should be set up to promote the renewal of the Baltic States’ independence, 
international recognition of the Baltic States, harmonisation of the Baltic States’ foreign 
policy goals, achieving withdrawal of the USSR army from their territories and defining a 
united position towards the USSR. 
A Political Act of significant importance to attracting wider attention to the aspirations of 
the Baltic nations to gain independence was the meeting in Vilnius on  December 990, 
of deputies of Supreme Councils that made an appeal to the parliaments of the world to 
achieve their strategic objectives of independence. 
The Baltic Assembly 4 (BA) was established, as a consultative and coordinating body on 8 
November 99 in Tallinn with the aim of promoting cooperation between the parliaments 
of the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania. Although 
decisions made by the Baltic Assembly are only advisory, they urge national parliaments 
and the Baltic Council of Ministers5 to coordinate actions and to solve the problems on 
parliamentary and governmental levels. The role of such regional institutions played a key role 
in attaining national objectives of the three republics especially in winning independence, 
consolidating their institutions, integrating in NATO and European Union. 
After joining the European family, Baltic cooperation institutions are continuing to play an 
important role facing new challenges and making efforts to strengthen democratic values 
and promote welfare, peace, and prosperity. In addition, the role of this regional initiative 
in the new international environment as well as the effectiveness of this cooperation as a 
possible model for other regions continues to be in the international agenda.
4 http://www.baltasam.org
5 http://www.baltasam.org
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2. The role of Baltic Cooperation in terms of foreign policy, economic and 
military cooperation between
The renewal of the Baltic cooperation at the end of ’80 all the activities at various levels 
among the three countries can be easily commented as a strive to create a new European 
identity of the three republic in their efforts of independence, state building and integration 
in the Euro-Atlantic club, an inspiration that had encountered EC sympathy since Cold War 
times.  Immigrants from these countries in the West had lobbied for this new identity which 
consequently brought to the European Parliament’s declaration on  January 98 that 
condemned Soviet occupation of the three republics and urging that EC foreign ministers 
“submit the issue of the Baltic states to the Decolonization Subcommittee of the UN.”6 This 
document can be regarded as the first building block for future EU–Baltic cooperation.7 This 
regional approach to the issue by the EP was again an encouraging factor to the political 
cooperation process of the Baltic Republic as Cold War period was coming to an end. 
The December 990 political declaration of the three Baltic Supreme Councils 8 that called 
“USSR to give up its policy of threats and its political, economic and military pressure in 
relation to the Baltic countries; to immediately start intergovernmental negotiations with the 
Baltic countries concerning the recognition of their independence; to realize an agreement 
concerning the schedules of withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic territories, and non-
interference by these troops in Baltic affairs should be guaranteed; all obstacles preventing 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia from maintaining cross-border contacts with the other parts 
of the world should be eliminated” 9 was a remarkable event that laid the foundations of 
political, economic and military cooperation among countries of this regional initiative. 
Furthermore, it indicated the political vision for a soft transition to independent statehood 
by appealing to representatives of European countries and international organisations to 
“express their readiness to participate as third parties in Baltic-USSR negotiations”0 for 
achieving above mentioned objectives.
In the course of past two decades the main components of cooperation in foreign policy of 
the Baltic Republics might be pictured as setting their new identity in the following mains 
aspects:
• Integration into NATO and EU and post-integration perspective of this regional 
cooperation perspective in the framework of Eastern EU and NATO policies, 
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• Instrumentalizing intensive partnerships  with Nordic Cooperation countries to cope with 
challenges of reform to EU and NATO integration, security and economic cooperation 
through a Baltic Sea cooperation perspective, 
• Eastern policy,  relations with Russia,  
The above three aspects of cooperation of the Baltic Republics once the independence 
status was achieved was not an easy process.  But, it became obvious that integration and 
regional cooperation were important in terms of economic development and enhancing 
security vis-a-vis another state considered potentially threatening. On the other hand 
becoming EU and NATO members needed time and resources. Thus, debate existed because 
Baltic Republics initially believed that regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area, might 
divert them from pursuing EU and NATO membership, and thereby leaving them in the grey 
zone between East and West. But soon they realized that engaging in regional cooperation 
became seen as a route to Western security organizations, and a training ground of the 
transition process, via which they could prove their ‘acceptableness’ and ‘Europeanness’ 
to the rest of Western Europe and NATO.  Precisely this second approach was ratified 
in Riga, on  April 995 in the Resolution on Strengthening the Process of Integration 
into the European Union. This Resolution considers three Nordic countries members of 
EU (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) as liaisons of Baltic States in relation to the European 
Union especially in the harmonization of the legislation and advocacy. 
Right after their independence, the Baltic institutions, mainly the Baltic Assembly issued 
successive declaration and resolution on NATO and EU integration. In early resolution 
in 994, the BA, anxious on the security of the countries urged to their governments 
to develop without delay a common policy and take effective joint preparatory steps - 
organizational, administrative, military and political - to facilitate an early accession to 
NATO by all three Baltic States. While in its Declaration of April, 997 the Baltic Assembly 
considered membership in the EU as one of the top priorities in the foreign policy of the 
Baltic States. In addition to such regional approaches to NATO and EU, the BA would also 
encourage or appeal to Euro-Atlantic  decision makers that even a quick invitation 4 (“an 
achievement of one of the three states is an achievement of all three”); to join the NATO 
for any of the three countries of the Baltic Republics would be consider a joint success. 
Another characteristic of the Baltic cooperation in terms of foreign police and security is 
that in a very unique way their approach to NATO and EU accession was considered one 
 Browning and Joenniemi : Regionality beyond Security?
 http://www.baltasam.org
 http://www.baltasam.org
4 http://www.baltasam.org Resolution on NATO Membership of the Baltic States 997
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way process, which means that there exist many resolutions that refer to the integration 
processes as a common one of the top foreign policy objectives.  
In addressing security threats the Baltic Assembly appealed in 994 to the Assembly of the 
Western European Union to consider the Baltic countries as its collective partner in military 
co-operation. In December 995 Baltic Assembly expressed full support for the efforts made 
by the governments and their subordinated structures in coordinating joint defense and 
security activities manifested in the formation of joint military unit BALTBAT.5But the BA 
asked for additional improving co-operation in security and defense matters by extending 
the co-operation to cover air surveillance, sea border control, land forces and their weapons, 
communications systems, etc., including the formation of joint Baltic structures for 
coordinating the activities of the national defense forces, and report to the Baltic Assembly 
on the progress concerning the preparation of a defense agreement of the Baltic States. 
The formation of Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) and the other important 
initiatives undertaken have been a demonstration that the Baltic states have made regional 
and international cooperation an integral part of their security policy. 
The Baltic cooperation model offers ample opportunity in approximating legislation and 
economic cooperation to offer incentives to European foreign investments and the Baltic 
Seas area was another possibility to instrumentalise cooperation with the Nordic countries. 
Such cooperation among the countries of the two regions included efforts to integrate 
into the political and economic structures of Europe, development and intensification of 
economic ties, but also new regional security forms for the Baltic Sea area.  
This cooperation became so intense that Nordic Council on 7 June 0006 extended 
an invitation to the Baltic States to join the Nordic Council as an opportunity to further 
development of the northern European region in the so-called Northern Dimension Project. 
This multifaceted cooperation would include in addition to Nordic direct investments and 
tourism development to Baltic countries also joint working groups in political, academic, 
common educational space, civil society, local government up to joint standing groups 
to international forums. Cooperation on energy issues has been an important economic 
cooperation area among the Baltic and Nordic countries. 
Since the first half of the pervious decade steps were undertaken to develop cooperation 
between Baltic Region with the Benelux Countries mainly in the field of economy, trade and 
5 http://www.baltasam.org
6 http://www.norden.org/start/start.asp?lang=6
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development of communications systems. The cooperation between these two regions was 
considered by the Baltic States7 as another possibility to achieve closer relations with the 
European Union. 
Almost simultaneously with Benelux cooperation, the Baltic Assembly (in May 994) 
considered relations with another regional initiative and specifically that of the Visegrad 
countries as beneficial to the national interest of the Baltic states, thus encouraging 
cooperation in the political, economic, security and cultural fields. 
The above described regional approaches were described from the perspective of Baltic 
countries regional relations to accomplish their national interest in terms of security, 
economy but most importantly to accelerate their accession into the Euro-Atlantic Club. As 
it was described Baltic and Nordic cooperation was the most productive Baltic relationship. 
Some experts define Baltic Sea regionalism more as a tendency to focus on making the 
region a profitable market place. This might explain why the EU has been sympathetic to 
Baltic Sea regionalism, since the project is consistent with both the Union’s wider economic 
objectives as well the goal of promoting closer relations between the Union and its near 
neighborhood.8 Indeed, the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) tends to give priority 
to infrastructural projects, market economy related issues, investment, the promotion of 
economic cooperation, trade and investments, as well as the combat of organized crime.
As explained the eastern neighborhood policy of the Baltic Republics as above explained 
constitute the first ultimate goal of the Baltic cooperation to achieve national independence 
from USSR. Burdened with the legacies of the past,  the process of the independent state 
building on the part of Baltic Republics but also Russian Federation was a relatively long 
one, emotional with too much of rhetoric of history. As a consequence, the necessity of 
working together in areas of economic and cross-border co-operation was overshadowed 
by the lack of strategic thinking with a clear inability to go beyond history towards new 
European relations. 
The Baltic States’ idea of “returning to Europe” remained closely intertwined with the 
idea of “distancing from Russia”. Thus for the most part of the last century decade, while 
with all other western and southern neighbors, the Baltic institutions were pressing for 
building relations with Russian federation pressure was exerted for demarcation.  The 
Baltic Assembly, meeting in Jurmala (Kemeri) on -5 May 994, urges the leadership 
of the Russian Federation (among others)  to end the psychological and propagandistic 
7 http://www.baltasam.org
8 The Baltic States and the EU Neighborhood Policy Riga November -4 007 
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pressure, to demonstrate justice, understanding and a sense of responsibility, to recognise 
the material and moral damage inflicted on the Baltic States and its citizens during the 
Soviet occupation; to recognise the existence of unresolved territorial issues in the relations 
with Estonia and Latvia which were caused by the Soviet Union; not to exert economic or 
other pressure on the Baltic States, to recognise the fact that the Russian Federation as 
the successor state of the Soviet Union is also responsible for compensation of the damage 
and loss caused by the Soviet Union to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the years of 
occupation.  
Baltic - Russian realities are far from the desirable preconditions for co-operation and 
have not lived up to their potentials. Coinciding with the Baltic states’ almost non-existent 
Eastern policy, EU institutions and structures have concentrated much more on neglected 
problems and certain approaches to conflict resolution than on pushing new strategies for 
co-operation between Russia and the Baltic states. The Baltic States are a particularly 
sensitive aspect for the enlarged European Union’s Eastern policy, and they differ from the 
other new member states—first and foremost from Poland—in that they have been deploying 
less vigor in shaping relations towards their eastern neighbors, especially Russia. 
To describe the current, still very tense relations, an opinion poll of 600 Russians on which 
states were perceived as Russia’s enemies, conducted by the Moscow-based Levada Center 
in June 005, according to which respondents named Latvia (49%), Lithuania (4%), 
Georgia (8%) and Estonia (%). 
Analysts suggest that relations between the Baltic Republics and Russia need to strategic 
development in a European framework in order to go beyond the current deadlock and clarify 
mutual beneficial perspective.
2. Baltic Cooperation as a model in formulating regional policies, and model 
for other regions 
“We tell this story because it contains an important lesson. The West again faces major 
questions about how to reach out to young democracies striving to join our institutions 
-- in the Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The challenge is to tie these countries to 
the West and its values at a time when enlargement fatigue is setting in and Moscow’s 
opposition is growing. Once again we are in need of creative diplomacy that could bridge the 
gap between what some of these countries seek and what the West can offer right now. It 
happened 0 years ago in the Baltics; it can happen again”.9
9 By Riekstins, Foreign Minister of Latvia. R Asmus, Executive Director GMF, Wall Street Journal January, 6, 008
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In fact, Baltic institutions, and above all Baltic Assembly as the most institutionalized 
structure of Baltic cooperation have scored great achievements in support of the 
consolidation of the Baltic Area, but also in attaining Baltic countries main political 
objectives, independence, integration into NATO and EU, and development of the three 
republics neighborhood policy. Special credit might be given to the development of common 
Baltic economic, educational and information technology space, support harmonisation of 
legislation in conformity with requirements of the European Union, improvement of border - 
crossing procedures, establishment of the BA Prizes for Literature, the Arts and Science.0
Since they entered the European Union, the Baltic States have been able to develop their 
cooperation with the South Caucasus countries, in regional plans - among which the well-
known ‘+’- as well as in bilateral plans. Official visits have been multiplied so much that 
a real political criss-crossing took place as Caucasian and Baltic deputies, ministers, and 
heads of states regularly link up Yerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi with Vilnius, Riga, and Tallin. 
Defense, Euro-Atlantic integration or even law reform are the fields of cooperation in the 
forefront of these efforts but the Caucasus region is still far from being able to follow the 
Baltic States, in particular concerning the delicate issue of their relationships with their 
Russian neighbour. Like all the cooperation initiatives in the region, the relationships 
between the Baltics and the South Caucasians are based on good intentions, a certain 
affinity based on a common history, but up to now, this does not seem to have resulted in 
anything as decisive as in the cooperation that previously united in the Nordic countries 
(Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland) and the Baltic countries in the ‘+’ and 
‘+5’ plans. This is mainly because the South Caucasus has not yet stated specific 
expectations and remains monopolized by domestic political issues.
But to this role of the Baltic countries, there exist questions that are framed within the EU-
Russia context, in which the latter considers this initiative, as a “anti-Russian front”. Do 
the Baltic countries want to impose themselves in the EU by their specific identity, that of 
countries that imported the European model and then exported it in a post-Soviet version?
The Baltic Model of the United Nations (BALMUN) is a recent project, through which 
regionals intend to export their experience in building bridges throughout the world. Two 
international conferences have been organized by the BALMUN Secretariat based on the 
0 www.baltasam.org
 SPECIAL REPORT- These Baltic states who want to export their model of integration into the West to the East By 
Célia CHAUFFOUR and Lili DI PUPPO in Paris and London
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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foundation of our world’s diversity. This new Baltic institutions intends to export to other 
continents the philosophy of building partnerships and building bridges between countries 
and peoples.  
The Baltic States have also proved their commitment to wider security concerns through 
their contribution on the ground in Bosnia with joint military units. The role of the Baltic 
States in the NATO enlargement process is thus a special one. 
Activities and efforts are being made also to offer to the Western Balkans a model of lessons 
learned and success stories from the Baltic cooperation and success has been not lacking. 
The Adriatic Charter (A) that brought together in 00 Albania, Croatia and Macedonia 
with the sponsorship of the US, modeled after the similar experience of the US with Baltic 
Republics in their NATO project gave positive results. Actually A is becoming A5 with 
Montenegro and Bosnia - Herzegovina on board with their aspiration of NATO Membership. 
Contradictions exist in WB for a deeper cooperation of the countries that would incorporate 
all countries of the region for similar initiatives. Such difficulties are observed from missing 
dimension of local ownership by the countries of Western Balkans in the framework of the 
Stability Pact, or the current Regional Cooperation Council. 
3. Conclusions 
Opinions concerning regional cooperation range from total scepticism to exaggerated 
support; nevertheless, this paper considers regional cooperation model as important 
approach that has proved to be beneficial in attaining strategic national priorities of the 
countries involved.  
The Nordic cooperation models has resisted decades, Baltic and Visegrad cooperation 
schemes are still active and are being re-dimensioned in the current international challenges 
after EU and NATO integration of the countries. For more than 5 years the Baltic Assembly 
has benefited from the experience of the Nordic Council and the Benelux Inter parliamentary 
Consultative Council. It should be mentioned that cooperation among the three initiatives 
is currently more active than ever, focusing in reviewing common priorities and on the most 
efficient models for regional development.
It is obvious that there is a mutual interest in setting and reviewing common priorities. 
Therefore, the Baltic, Nordic and Benelux countries need to continue discussions on the 
most efficient models for regional development. They are also active in the Nordic Dimension, 
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which would provide the opportunity to develop comprehensive dialogue with the European 
Union of the countries including Russia. This shows that regional cooperation based on 
patterns “as the Baltic Cooperation” or other are, not only instruments to deal with policy 
objectives of the countries involved (had it not been so this initiative would have ended 
with the EU and NATO membership of the countries), but the substance itself to long term 
objectives and prosperity of the countries involved.  
All these go to show that regional cooperation and neighbourhood active are relations are 
complimentary if not instrumental to achieving the main national objectives of the countries 
involved. Furthermore, the Baltic Assembly, its role and activities on which this paper is most 
based on, proves to be a very effective model of parliamentary cross-border cooperation. Its 
role constitutes an example to other regions first and foremost because of its “consultative 
and coordinating capacities”, which allows for more flexibility and decision to governments 
and other executive institutions. In most of cases, Baltic Assembly meetings offered just 
“suggestions” or made “appeals” to government of the three Republics to decide and 
execute. 
Baltic cooperation started as an existentialist movement of the countries through 
“independence” project, continued as a NATO and EU partnership scheme for “membership”, 
and is building its future within the Euro-Atlantics space through “European North 
Dimension”.
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 VII. THE STATE OF NORDIC COOPERATION IN A 
CHANGING EUROPE
Arne Bengt Lauritsen, Deputy Head of Mission, Danish Embassy, Tirana
The Deputy Head of Mission of the Danish Embassy brought in the regional conference the Nordic experience of cooperation. After appreciating the importance of this 
regional event and congratulating with the organizers he said that it is a pleasure to see 
many participants and experience the great interest for regional solutions in a globalised 
world. It is indeed an honour and a privilege to be partaking in an exchange of know-how and 
experience of regional co-operation which is of such great importance to us all.
Today many countries are struggling in face of a deepening financial and following social 
crisis, implications of climate change and unresolved international and regional conflicts, 
which need concrete action without delay to promote their settlement. Our governments 
face these and other challenges, which all require an active coordinated response, for which 
organizations with a specific regional focus such as the Nordic Council of Ministers, Council 
of Baltic Sea States, the Visegrad group, the Regional Cooperation Council and SECI can all 
play a vital role in a globalized world. These regional efforts and instruments are well placed 
to contribute as facilitating elements towards the resolve of many of these problems. 
Regional cooperation has the opportunity to be able form an identity, facilitate solutions 
and to a great extent predetermine a regions future development. 
The Nordic Council of Ministers, active now since almost 40 years, work strongly to carry 
out the ideas behind the concept of regional cooperation, to facilitate the resolution of 
problems and promote the development of an effective regional course of action. 
He took the opportunity to give some background on the Nordic cooperation and of the 
Nordic Council of Ministers in particular.  Nordic cooperation is age-old, and rests upon its 
own geographical, historical and cultural cohesion. The cooperation comprises Denmark, 
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Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden as well as the autonomous territories the Faeroe 
Islands, Greenland and the Åland Islands. 
After the Second World War, the Nordic nations responded to the division and bipolarization 
in the international arena by joining forces. The co-operation was formalized as early as 
in 95, before the formation of the European Economic Community. Now, more than 50 
years later, Nordic co-operation is both powerful and extremely important.
Official Nordic co-operation is channeled through two organisations: The Nordic Council 
and the Nordic Council of Ministers. The Nordic Council, formed in 95, is the forum for 
inter-parliamentary co-operation. The Nordic Council of Ministers, formed in 97, is the 
forum for Nordic governmental co-operation. 
Overall responsibility for the Nordic Council of Ministers lies with the respective Prime 
Ministers. In practice, responsibility is delegated to the Ministers for Nordic Co-operation 
and to the Nordic Committee for Co-operation, which co-ordinates the day-to-day work of 
the official political Nordic co-operation
Despite its name the Nordic Council of Ministers consists, in fact, of  individual councils 
of ministers. Most of the Nordic ministers for specific policy areas mets a couple of times 
a year, e.g. culture, environment, education, social and heath, energy, and finance. Other 
ministers meet only on informal basis, for example the Nordic foreign ministers and ministers 
for defence. 
The Nordic cooperation also consists of around 0 Nordic institutions with different 
responsibilities. Some is focusing on health issues and others on research. The Chairmanship 
of the Council of Ministers, which is held for a period of one year, rotates between the five 
Nordic countries. Decisions made in the Council of Ministers are unanimous.  Issues are 
prepared and followed up by the various Committees of Senior Officials which consist of civil 
servants from the member countries. Iceland is currently chairing the Council of Ministers 
and which will be followed by Denmark in 00.
The Nordic cooperation has three main perspectives: The Nordic region in its own identity, 
the Nordic region as part of the Baltic Sea region – or perhaps more aptly Northern Europe 
– and the Nordic region as an active participant in a broad European cooperation, primarily 
within the EU. 
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The NCM has instigated, supported and is taking part in a vast number of regional initiatives, 
to address and advance, the unique challenges and opportunities which are present in the 
Baltic Sea region. Inclusive cooperation remains a keyword for the various activities of NCM. 
To facilitate collaboration in the wider Baltic Sea Region NCM has offices in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania (since 99), in St Petersburg (since 995) and in Kaliningrad (since 006). 
NCM’s cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is a political cooperation generating 
joint Nordic-Baltic benefits. The key areas of cooperation in the coming years are:
• Education, research and innovation
• Business, cluster networks and creative industries
• Environment, climate and energy
• Challenges to welfare societies
• Cross-border regional cooperation  
He underlineed that Nordic-Baltic co-operation within the framework of the EU will 
gain increased importance in a positive sense, without being perceived, for this reason, 
as promoting the creation of blocs. The fact remains that smaller countries in the same 
geographical area will often share common aims, even if they may not be specifically 
embodied in established relations.
An important aspect of NCM’s cooperation with Northwest Russia is support to the 
implementation of the Northern Dimension. The NCM sees itself as a contributor to the 
fulfilment of the Northern Dimension objectives – and has therefore for example made the 
Northern Dimension an integrated part of its policies and collaboration activities in the 
Baltic Sea Region and the Barents region. The key areas for the NCM cooperation with 
Northwest Russia in the coming years are: 
• Education, research and innovation
• Environment, climate and energy
• Conditions for economic cooperation and trade
• Northern Dimension partnerships
• Promotion of democracy and civic society
NCM supports today approximately 00 projects related to the Northern Dimension. Within 
this cooperation, and to make it more effective, participation on all levels, by both men and 
women, and the inclusion of civil society remains cornerstones. NCM remain focused on 
youth’s access to independent higher education and an example of this is the support to the 
European Humanities University in Vilnius for Belarusian students. 
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This support is given through a newly established trust fund in cooperation with the 
European Union as well as other individual countries and donors such as the US and many 
of the Baltic and Visegrad countries. The Nordic Council of Ministers also have enhanced 
cooperation with other regional organizations such as Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Arctic 
Council and the Council of Baltic Sea States. 
As an example of cooperation with the Council of Baltic Sea States, the two organisation 
have initiated a project on strengthening cooperation among different Euro-regions around 
the Baltic Sea. The project, which has received support from the EC, has promoted spatial 
development and territorial integration in the Baltic Sea Region by strengthening the 
capacity of the Euro-regions and by building a network of Euro-regions for continuous 
capacity-building and sharing of experience. 
Furthermore, NCM place great importance on the role which NGO is playing and can play 
towards addressing many of the challenges within the broader Baltic Sea region. To this 
end, the Council of Ministers launched a special NGO Programme for the Baltic Sea Region 
in early October 006 funding co-operation initiatives between Nordic, Baltic, Polish, 
Belarusian and Russian NGOs. To date, more than 5 multinational NGO projects has been 
launched addressing issues such as human rights, environment, and social issues.
He also mentioned that the Nordic cooperation also have had cooperation in this part of 
Europe. Some years ago (00) an extensive cultural project, entitled Norden Balkan 
Culture Switch, was initiated between the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) and the West 
Balkan countries. The project had two objectives. Firstly, to build a new network between 
the Nordic and West Balkan countries. Secondly, to introduce the Nordic co-operation 
model. As the direct result of this initiative and the engagement of the cultural minister 
of Albania, the ministers of culture of the Nordic countries and 9 ministers of culture and 
representatives of South-East Europe met in Copenhagen under the Danish Chairmanship 
in 005. On that occasion the SEE Ministers and representatives signed the Charter of the 
Council of Ministers for Culture of South East Europe (SEE) in Copenhagen on  March 
005. Let me quote what was told by the current Danish Minister of Justice, at that time 
the Minister for Cultural Affairs, Brian Mikkelsen: “I see this joint meeting as demonstrating 
that Nordic co-operation is not just a historical and inwardly-directed matter. Our peaceful 
co-operation in the area of culture can be a source of inspiration not merely among our close 
neighbours, but also in areas of Europe recently marked by violent conflicts”.
The challenges related to climate, environment, energy, research, health, welfare, wellbeing 
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and the financial markets cannot be solved by one country one its own. They require a co-
ordinated approach. For the Nordic countries it is natural to look for joint solutions. The 
Nordic prime ministers underlined this in June 007 when they took action to strengthen 
Nordic co-operation as a means to better meet the challenges of globalization. They stated 
a shared and positive attitude towards opportunities and challenges of globalisation. 
According to the prime ministers Nordic co-operation should be more focused on 
globalization and the opportunities stemming from it. They therefore called upon joint 
Nordic activities related to research and education, innovation, climate and energy, welfare 
and health issues.  The prime ministers also urged for more profound co-operation with the 
Baltic countries and other regional organizations to reinforce the competitiveness of the 
entire Baltic Sea region and Europe.
The new globalization initiatives meant that Nordic co-operation has entered a new phase. 
We are now working hard with our new agenda and the recent financial crisis increases the 
need and urgency for this new direction in Nordic collaboration.  
Let me account for some of the main activities that we have initiated in response to these 
challenges: Within the Nordic Council of Ministers’ general focus on globalization we are 
pursuing a set of 5 concrete globalization projects. The Nordic Top-level research initiative 
is one of the most interesting of these current globalization projects.  
The initiative shall develop excellent research in close collaboration between research and 
enterprises and promote innovation. In the first phase the focus is on climate, energy and 
the environment, and in the second phase the focus will be on welfare and health. 
Furthermore, the initiative aims to strengthen the knowledge base and competitiveness of 
the Nordic countries.  It enables a critical mass on central areas, on a scale that the countries 
cannot achieve each on their own. It will also enable dynamic effects from already existing 
national research investments. 
Through this initiative the Nordic countries are creating a platform that can be used for 
wider international cooperation and interaction. This is the largest research cooperation 
project in the Nordic council of minister’s history, the test program of the project has a 
public funding of approximately 50 million EUROs over the next five years, with additional 
funds to be drawn into it from the private sector and EU programs. This is extraordinarily 
ambitious within the Nordic context.
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Other projects are supporting the climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December this Year, 
promotion of higher education in the Nordic countries, a yearly Nordic Globalization Forum, 
harmonization of electricity markets in the Nordic countries, development and profiling of 
the Nordic Region as a centre for creative industries just to mention a few. The 00 Danish 
Chairmanship will remain firmly committed towards this coordinated approach towards 
global challenges and opportunities finding and developing joint solutions. 
Finally he added that the necessity of regional cooperation is not always a sufficient 
condition for successful regional cooperation, however, most countries acknowledged the 
benefits of regional cooperation in various fields. We should and can not necessarily copy 
a mechanism of regional cooperation, but we should all take the opportunity to learn from 
each other, and the experiences each of us has made. 
He underlined that the Nordic Council of Ministers strive for a continuous development of 
relations with other the regional organisations, to learn from experiences made and to find 
joint practical solutions. We do not just want to establish formal regional frameworks, but 
enable a dialogue on important issues and find concrete solutions to the many challenges 
we face such as the environment, education and health.  I am convinced that we face and 
can rise towards these many challenges with confidence and hard work, and that regional 
cooperation will play a vital part towards their solution.
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 VIII. REGIONAL OwNERSHIP: DOES IT ExIST IN THE 
REGIONAL COOPERATION SCHEMES?
Mimika Loshi, Expert on Parliamentary Cooperation, RCC Secretariat, Sarajevo
After thanking IDM most sincerely for their generous hospitality and for organization of this event Ms Loshi underlined the fact that regional ownership marks a new era in 
regional cooperation schemes after Regional Cooperation Council took over from Stability 
Pact for SEE. The term “regional ownership’ started to circulate as substantial progress on 
the ground was achieved over the years since Stability Pact creation and political, economic 
and social conditions improved throughout the region. The need was felt for a more regionally 
owned framework to reflect the increased maturity of the region.
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) , the organization that I represent, just a few weeks 
ago had its first anniversary of its foundation and this seems a good moment to look at what 
its structure looks like in order to answer the question.  
To that effect she spoke about three layers or regional schemes in which regional cooperation 
can be best perceived and encountered. First one is the political layer depicted by the 
SEECP; second one is the operational layer – the RCC and third one are the small cells 
scattered around the region- and those are regional initiatives. All these three schemes are 
very much connected and cooperate very closely.
1. Political layer – South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) 
SEECP is a political forum launched in 996 Sofia. As the only “homemade” initiative, the 
SEECP seeks to define itself as an authentic voice of SEE with its rotating chairmanship, 
 participating states, and serving as a political umbrella to RCC. At the Bulgaria-chaired 
meeting in Sofia, the SEE countries laid the foundations for regional co-operation for the 
purposes of creating an atmosphere of trust, good neighbourly relations and stability. 
Objectives: include the strengthening of security and political situation, intensification of 
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economic relations and co-operation in human resources, democracy, justice, and battle 
against illegal activities. It is the intention of the SEECP to enable its members to approach 
the European and Euro-Atlantic structures through the strengthening of good neighborly 
relations and transformation of the region into an area of peace and stability.
2.  Operational layer – Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) 
Regional Cooperation Council is the successor of Stability Pact for SEE with the main 
difference being that it is led, and financed / by the countries of the region and employs 
only people from the region unlike SP who was led and financed entirely by internationals. 
The other finances come / form the European Commission, / by the individual donor 
countries. RCC is the operational arm of the SEECP but also works under the SEE countries 
agenda.
Objectives  
The Regional Co-operation Council inherited the mandate of the Stability Pact to oversee 
co-operation processes in South Eastern Europe and to support European and Euro-
Atlantic integration of the region. Enhance regional cooperation, re-branding the region as 
well as become the main interlocutor between EC and the SEE countries on the EUs MB 
IPA funds.
The RCC functions as a focal point for regional cooperation in Southeast Europe. Also RCC 
provides the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) with operational capacities 
and acts as a forum for the continued involvement of those members of the international 
donor community engaged in the region. The work of the RCC focuses on six priority areas: 
• economic and social development, 
• energy and infrastructure, 
• justice and home affairs, 
• security cooperation,
• building human capital, and 
• parliamentary cooperation as an overarching theme. 
The organization maintains close working relations with all actors of relevance in these 
areas, such as governments, international organizations, international financial institutions, 
regional organizations, civil society and the private sector.
3. Regional initiatives 
Approximately 5 regional initiatives and task forces which have since their creation most 
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of them from Stability Pact times are still very active and have their means of generating 
funds and channeling projects and programmes.
 The RCC provides political guidance to and receives substantive input from relevant regional 
task forces and initiatives active in specific thematic areas of regional cooperation.
All these initiatives are based in the region and supported by host governments. They are 
the backbone of RCCs work since each of them has some kind of status relationship with 
the RCC secretariat. The regional initiatives range from those focusing on security such as 
RACVIAC and SEESAC; to those in Building Human Capital  - such as Task Force Building 
fostering human capital and ERI-SEE; Gender Task force;  Economic and social affairs: 
CEFTA, e-SEE, Health Network, Business Advisory Council; Justice and Home Affairs- 
Migration Asylum Refugee Return Initiative, Regional Anti-corruption Initiative. 
In conclusion she added that the region has reached maturity and it is palpable in these 
types of regional cooperation schemes that exist and were mentioned but most importantly 
this new era marks what Erhard Busek observes “first time the fate of the countries in SEE 
is not decided abroad in other European or world capitals but in the region itself”. We are 
finally on the driving seat and we are the ones deciding where the region will go.
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 Ix. IDEAS FOR FOLLOw UP: 
 wHAT CAN wORK FOR THE REGION?
European best practices of cooperation are of a great importance for the WB countries not only for learning from their successes but also from their mistakes. In this context, 
it is of a great importance to take into consideration the point of views of civil society’s 
representatives, member of parliaments and academics from the WB region. Their ideas 
were of a crucial importance in the regional conference in order to brainstorm and understand 
the factors that are impeding the region to further cooperate between each other, and also 
attempt to draw recommendations which could work for the region. 
All the participants from different Balkan countries agreed on the fact that most of the 
initiatives of cooperation are coming from abroad and it is important that the countries of 
the region take ownership of the process and support these first initiatives in all the fields. 
They should also deal with internal issues but also with inherited unsolved problems with 
each other. 
Arian Starova, a member of the Albanian parliament and President of the Atlantic 
Association of Albania, focused his message on what could be done on the Parliamentary 
level to boost regional cooperation. He emphasized the fact that in the WB this issue is very 
problematic, wide and opened. He suggested the idea of the creation of a Forum such as a 
Parliamentary Regional Assembly in order to discuss different issues between the countries. 
Mr. Starova emphasized that nowadays, the region is much safer as it has been in the past, 
and the parliaments should be initiators of concrete projects in order to face problems of 
the region. They should be more dynamic by initiating concrete proposals thus having an 
impact, pursue tangible actions and not remain at the level of discussion. The best way to 
start with is to cooperate in all areas and more particularly in the economic field. He brought 
the example of the highway Durres - Kukes which will be useful not only for Albanians but 
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also for the whole region. In the future it can be used by other people from the Balkans 
and will have a positive impact for greater economic, cultural and tourist exchange. In this 
framework, Mr Starova stressed the fact that non-governmental organizations as well, can 
play a greater role and be more active in raising awareness and organize round tables by 
focusing on different aspects of regional cooperation. Hence, by having big problems at 
the institutional level, regional cooperation can move on in a more advance stage only if 
academia, civil society, think tanks try to be more active. 
  
Arta Dade, the Vice Chairman of Parliamentary Commission of Foreign Affairs supported 
the idea of the creation of caucuses on the Albanian parliament which would support all 
the initiatives on regional cooperation as a key initiative to further deepen cooperation in 
the region and as the main tool for having an impact. She also urged like her colleague Mr. 
Starova, for a parliament more active on this regard. The creation of such caucuses in other 
Balkan countries parliaments would be of a great importance in order to coordinate programs 
and initiatives and further push for their implementation. Additionally, she focused also on 
the idea of intensifying the Parliamentary Diplomacy with a particular focus on the reforms 
regarding Euro-Atlantic integration. However, she said that the parliamentary dialogue 
should be more effective through the active participation of MP-s from various political 
wings. 
Qemal Minxhozi, MP and Former Ambassador of Albania to Denmark, emphasized the 
importance of this conference as regional cooperation is a key element for being successful 
in certain areas such as environment, energy and justice. With reference to the latter 
he mentioned that criminal activities such as cross border crime and different kind of 
trafficking are more likely to be successful if the countries cooperate with each other and 
can not be solved by countries themselves. Thus, a coordinated approach is needed also in 
the field of environment, energy, climate, and transport by mentioning the Nordic successful 
experience of cooperation in such fields. Because of the limited size of each WB country 
and the division of the economic space in the region, there is no other option then to embark 
an intense regional cooperation as the best way forward. 
Dusan Janic from Serbia focused on the sustainability of regional cooperation initiatives. 
He emphasized the fact that regional initiatives have a great importance but for having an 
impact, it is necessary to think for middle or long term initiatives. Additionally, he stressed 
the fact that firstly we should be open to cooperation and afterwards we can talk for regional 
cooperation. In the case of Serbia he mentioned current internal problems between different 
actors which have not a unified position and are not playing a positive role in the case of 
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Kosovo. He also stressed the fact that experts may offer their contribution and reflect 
recommendations of the Europeans, nevertheless at the national level the voice of experts 
is not sufficiently heard. He believes that the best way for improving cooperation in Serbia 
is to solve issues related to the national identity and cooperate more with international 
organizations, particularly with the European Union as the majority of Serbian politician look 
toward Moscow. Therefore the political will of the governments of the countries is crucial 
for the advancement of regional cooperation. Mr Janic considered advantageous to work on 
cross-border euro-regions among different bordering areas of Western Balkan countries.       
According to Gjergji Vurmo from Institute for Democracy and Mediation perhaps one of 
the main deficiencies of the Balkan record of regional cooperation represents the fact that, 
frequently external incentives and factors have been the major driving force of regional 
interactions and cooperation initiatives. Furthermore, the main rationale behind these 
initiatives has included “common interests” as perceived by external actors which have 
not always corresponded to the local context and needs. So, instead of using geographical 
criteria – e.g. Western Balkans, Adriatic / Black Sea etc. – for defining and shaping regional 
cooperation, local actors and stakeholders (and not external ones) should not only engage, 
but most importantly, should initiate and lead regional cooperation initiatives as an added 
value and significant advantage for the national development, regional achievements and 
common road towards developed communities.
      
Sanja Mihajlovic from the Centre for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina focused 
on her speech on the regional cooperation of civil society organisations and their cooperation 
with the parliaments. She emphasized the fact that the political conditions in the Balkans 
are changing, with countries moving to being EU pre-accession countries (status of 
transition). This has had a strong impact on the cooperation strategies of all donors, and 
has left the civil society and political leaders in these countries in a state of incertitude. 
Donors are moving out of the countries, and new donors and funding mechanisms are not 
yet in place, or are not yet well known to the public. A chance to share experiences, compare 
policies, and discuss possible future plans seems highly important as well as appropriate at 
this juncture in time. 
After expressing her gratitude to the organizers for the invitation Ms. Stojanovic focused on 
the situation in her country. She highlighted the fact that the current situation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is complex and ambiguous, defined as the most critical since the achievement 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This is a view of both international and local specialists, 
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as well as ordinary people, faced with insecurity and fears for the future.  Burdened with 
difficult legacies of war and deterioration of society, Bosnia and Herzegovina has, more or 
less, been forced into the processes of reforms, conditional for its accession to the European 
Union and NATO, and crucial for the future development of the country. 
The implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) is ongoing 
since the st of July 008. The progress is evident but not satisfying, as only two thirds 
of the tasks that Bosnia and Herzegovina has regarding SAA, are fulfilled.  Complicated 
relations between political elite, weak state authorities and absence of adequate normative 
regulation practically disabled civil society in performing their role in the democratization of 
the security sector. Local experts who wished to ensure sustainability of such organizations 
often faced a number of obstacles often relating to ethnic mistrust within the local 
population, ad hoc financial support and weak coordination amongst the NGO sector itself. 
Despite a relatively large number of NGOs in BiH (about 9,000), a very small number of 
organizations are active in the field of security. For a long time the CSS was the only NGO 
dealing with security issues. In last two to three years, we noticed appearances of similar 
NGOs which devote their work mainly to the organization of public events with an aim to 
raise awareness amongst a wider audience. At the time when CSS was formed, there was 
no government institution on the state level in charge of security issues. In accordance with 
the DPA, all responsibility concerning security-related issues was assigned to the entity 
governments. Therefore, the starting phases of our activities were largely concerned with 
advocacy and lobbying of government officials for the establishment of the necessary 
state-level institutions in order to reach the international requirements. Parallel to this line 
of work, CSS’s activities also focused on promoting the democratic parliamentary oversight 
of the security sector and strengthening of the civil military relations. In that period CSS 
organized more that 0 seminars with different topics related to the explanation of the 
new security environment and necessities for conducting SSR as way to achieve fostering 
the process to Euro-Atlantic integration. CSS tried also to produce as many publications 
as possible from these events to contribute towards an evident lack of the educational 
material published in the local languages.    
Cooperation with local governments are on the whole not satisfactory, although during the 
past few years the situation seems to have improved with local authorities now beginning 
to understand the role and benefits of the NGO sector. There are some mechanisms for 
cooperation already in place, such as: Memorandum of Partnership signed last year between 
Council of Ministers of BiH and NGO sector; also municipalities are required to allocate a 
part of their budget to the NGO sector and some municipalities even have representatives 
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from the NGO sector involved in the decision making process.  In the case of CSS, we have 
a long standing cooperation with the Joint Parliamentary Commission on Defence and 
Security, and we have acted as a support element to their work. By this I mean, executing 
projects that fall under the auspices of security sector reform. Moreover, in cooperation 
with JCDS, CSS has furthered the development of regional inter-parliamentary cooperation 
by organizing regional gatherings of parliamentarians in the field of democratic oversight of 
security sector. 
The involvement of civil society is considered a vital element in effective and accountable 
governance of security institutions, and in the long-term success of democratic reform 
efforts. Ideally, civil society institutions play a key role in monitoring government policy 
and the activities of state security institutions, in presenting alternative assessments of 
security issues, and in identifying alternate policy options.
In relation to the regional component of CSO cooperation in WB it can be stated that it 
is highly limited due to the insufficiently developed organisations, at least in the case of 
BiH. Over the past 5 years, or since the DPA, the cooperation has seen a positive trend. 
However, this trend is not permanent and relays more on the ad hoc basis of regional project 
implementation cooperation. In the instance of CSS, regional cooperation has revolved mainly 
on the issues of SALW control project, utilizing the regional centre SEESAC resources and 
expertise, and using them mostly in a sense of accessing database of similar organisations 
in the region. Moreover, regional cooperation has centered more recently on the issues of 
CFSP and ESDP. Unfortunately, there is a lack of sustainability in this cooperation, as when 
most of the projects are completed, so has the cooperation. 
In our experience, it is of imperative value to establish better institutional cooperation 
between academic institutions and CSO which still lacks formal and stable means of 
cooperation. On the notion of new incentives which are present in the region, EU Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP7) is certainly new for BiH, as we were only able to join it at the 
end of last year. This has enabled BiH to participate in research programmes in the WB 
region. 
In the case of CSS, we strongly advocate and strive for sustainable and formal shapes of 
cooperation on the regional level that would enhance the overall process of EU and E-A 
integration. Then the context of regional cooperation: just say on visa – currently BiH is 
undergoing an assessment phase by the observers of the EU visa liberalization aspect. 
Regional cooperation would benefit very much from this. 
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There is strong political will of the countries in the region to implement all of the mechanisms 
that would enable adherence to these declarations and simultaneously comply with EU 
standards and in some case, reform requirements.  
Professor Mladen Stanicic from Institute of International Relations from Croatia believes 
that the landmark where the WB countries should start their cooperation is the economic 
field. He brought the example of the European Community which started its cooperation 
initially on the economic level. Following this successful cooperation, additionally in the 
Balkans the best way to start deepening cooperation is the economic field where it is easier 
to agree with each other compared with other issues. Mr. Janic stressed the fact that Balkan 
countries are separated concerning common goals and interests. In the case of Kosovo he 
mentioned that Serbia is playing a dysfunctional role and earning time for that purpose. 
Serbia does not recognize Kosovo and if we create another regional institution but do not 
include Kosovo then we do not start well from the beginning. Therefore, the recognition of 
each other is an important step for further cooperation.
Ms Njomza Emini, Member of the Kosovo Parliament accentuated the great importance 
of regional cooperation in the light of European Union integration which is the main goal of 
the WB countries. She emphasized that fact that, in order to cooperate with each other and 
overcome the turbulent past the best start is the recognition of the new state of Kosovo 
which nowadays is an undeniable reality. She also mentioned that independence of Kosovo 
has been an important factor for the stability of the whole region. The next step regards its 
recognition by all the neighbors as a tool for paving the path for constructive cooperation.  
The Croatian Ambassador to Albania Mr. Darko Javorski focused on the reality of the WB 
by underlining the fact that in the region are missing important infrastructure facets such 
as railways, roads, electricity, communication ect. Therefore it is very hard to promote 
exchange if the region is missing the basics. Hence, governments of the WB countries must 
embark common projects on regional infrastructure, energy, etc. aiming the development of 
the region and increasing regional cooperation. Mr. Javorski also remarked that the region 
is plunged with many problems such as Kosovo vs Serbia, Croatia vs Slovenia, Macedonia 
vs Greece, Bosnia Herzegovina as such. Therefore although we should focus on promoting 
Balkan cooperation, regional actors should be more realistic by trying to face internal 
challenges, but not underestimating also the disputes with the neighbors.
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 x. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REGION
In the framework of the Regional conference that IDM organized in cooperation with its partners some recommendations were drawn, addressed to the governments and civil 
societies of the region. Recommendations will mainly consider internal dynamics of the 
region, while the exterior regional settings which favors and facilitates regional cooperation 
by a range of mechanisms and is particularly important in cases of conflictual societies like 
those in the Western Balkans (WB), is considered less. 
Regional cooperation is a principle of a great importance for security, political stability and 
economic progress in the Western Balkan countries. In view of the strategic importance of 
this principle the following recommendations come out of the conference: 
• The region must move away from what has been essentially an internationally driven 
process towards a greater ownership of its own future. Bearing this in mind, regional 
actors should work together to get real ownership of cooperation at all levels and areas. 
Stability Pact for South East Europe was conceived to be the first comprehensive 
conflict-prevention strategy of the international community and was transferred to 
regional ownership by creating the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in February 
008, thus helping the countries of the region to contribute to and enhance regional 
cooperation. However, regional ownership needs to be more visible in WB countries. The 
European Union but especially the countries of the WB should further assist the RCC 
in being more visible in their efforts to promote regional cooperation. In this regard it is 
essential that the momentum for regional cooperation should not be lost, on the contrary, 
further concrete initiatives from the countries of the region in the regional cooperation 
sphere should always be embraced.
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• Despite the differences, WB countries share common values of Western Liberal 
Democracies, peace, stability, human rights and market economy. Their final goal is to 
become part of Euro-Atlantic structures. In this context, even with divergent interests 
the WB should go beyond history toward new European relations and draw up a new 
framework for political cooperation. Narrow nationalist discourses should be abandoned 
in favor of more inclusive concepts of civil society, thus establishing closer local cross-
border ties, acknowledging the position of minorities and multiethnic societies.  
• Political will should be in place in order to have (sustainable) regional cooperation. 
Through intensive political regional cooperation, political consensus and mutual trust 
should be built up in the WB. Regional cooperation is needed as a key ingredient to 
stability, good neighborly and political relations, helping overcome nationalism. Political 
will and commitment by the countries of the region are crucial in promoting regional 
cooperation in its various forms. Mistrust among neighbors and ethnic antagonisms 
do not appear to be particularly strong deterrents to better cooperation; instead, the 
lack of genuine political will and the structural difficulties are identified as the main 
obstacles to regional cooperation.
• Regional cooperation is a useful instrument in addressing the security challenges facing 
the region, since many urgent issues, such as organized crime, corruption, integrated 
border management and illegal migration, can be effectively tackled only by a cross-
border approach. Therefore, closer cooperation here is indispensable, not just as an end 
in itself but also as a signal/message to the rest of Europe that WB countries share 
common objectives with the EU, on this issue. Hence, efforts to address the criminal 
threats to the stabilization and development of the region, will only be successful  if the 
WB countries work together to fight corruption and trans-national organized crime, 
which prevents legitimate economic growth and undermines democratic rule of law 
and democratic stability in the region.
• Deepening regional cooperation should be more economic driven. Regional cooperation 
is essential for increasing prosperity and economic growth. Therefore, economic 
development is a key issue if the WB countries are to make better, faster progress towards 
European integration. In many areas, such as energy, trade and transport, because of the 
limited size of each WB country and the division of the economic space in the region, 
there is no other option then to embark an intense regional cooperation as the best way 
forward. The recent financial crisis increases the need and urgency on this direction in 
order to reinforce the competitiveness, as a means to better face & meet the challenges 
TOWARDS REGIONAL ADVOCACY FOR COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS VIA EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES
75
of globalization (the Nordic Cooperation Council experience & V4 offer best practices on 
the this regard)
• Adapt EU (and more particularly Hungarian) experience and best practices associated 
with a successful EU-wide scheme on local development by implanting the LEADER 
approach in the Western Balkans. This blueprint can generate lasting effect by spurring 
development in local communities throughout the region. Whether in the EU or in the 
Western Balkans, rural development is neither a minor nor a peripheral problem. Rural 
development policy is an increasingly important component of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). Over half of the EU’s population lives in rural areas, which cover 90 % of 
the EU’s territory. In South Eastern Europe in general, agriculture earns 0 % or more of 
GDP, and a commensurate proportion of the population is rural, varying from 5 to 40 
% of the total population. Rural areas are an important vehicle for the preservation of 
cultural heritage and social values and their development involves significant political 
issues;
• European best practices (V4, Baltic, and Nordic) should be taken into consideration 
but also adjusted to the local context. Their experience has been developed in a context 
which is very different compared to the WB reality. Their consolidated national identity 
and existing state structures has served as the necessary institutional framework for 
cooperation. Their model presupposes the commitment to a single geopolitical orientation 
and pre-existing fundamental consensus on the principles of state coexistence. While 
in the WB their model may serve (eg. Visegrad model) as a form of trust building among 
states, which want to pursue the same accession path, and may demonstrate solidarity 
in selected issues of common interest. 
• Experience sharing should be promoted not only among different regions (V4, Nordic, 
Baltic countries, WB, EU members etc.) but also among countries within the same 
region (e.g. Croatian experience of EU integration being in a more advance stage 
compared to other countries would be very useful for the other countries of the region to 
catch up in the integration processes. A good example on this regard is the assistance 
given to Slovakia from the other Visegrad countries with concrete steps such as the 
assistance given by the Czechs concerning the harmonisation of Slovak legislation 
(provision of translations, consultations, ect) in the first years of negotiations with the 
EU. 
• Examine the adaptability of the Euroregion model to promote cross-border cooperation 
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in the region, as reflected in the work of the Carpathian Foundation. This is a cross-border 
network of regional foundations that focuses primarily on inter-regional and transfrontier 
activities, economic and community development in the bordering regions of Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. It encourages public/private/NGO partnerships, 
including cross-border and inter-ethnic approaches to help prevent conflicts and to 
promote regional development. It implements development programs and provides 
financial and technical assistance to projects which have resulted in tangible benefits 
to the communities on both sides of national borders of the Carpathian Mountains. The 
same initiative can be promoted between countries in the region such as Montenegro, 
Albania, Serbia and Kosovo, which share borders with each other and might improve 
the quality of live of pople in disavanteged areas in the small villages in the borders.
 
• Regional cooperation initiatives should be better defined and guided by common/ 
converging interests. While this form of voluntary regional community lacks forms of 
enforcement mechanisms, it may provide a component that is much needed in the process 
of EU accession, creation of a new identity and establishing norms, characteristics of a 
community of liberal democracies. Additionally, by cooperating on issues of converging 
interest which enjoy popular support will be easier to take initiatives that do not limit in 
defending single national interests but also take into account the common interest.    
• While institutionalized forms of regional cooperation should not be a goal per se (rather 
they follow naturally when all conditions are met) intensive contacts and discussion 
forums (official or not) between officials of all levels (ministers, deputy ministers, special 
envoys, MPs, Presidents, etc) would additionally serve regional cooperation needs/
challenges. Moreover, the already existing institutions, especially the existing ones in the 
field of parliamentary cooperation in SEE (i.e. Regional Secretariat for Parliamentary 
Cooperation in SEE, Cetinje Forum and COSAP) should be better utilized and supported 
by the national parliaments of the WB countries so they can deliver concrete results. 
• Critical views exist on the region’s lack in institution who will promote collaborative 
research among WB countries, providing incentives for cooperation, developing 
joint programmes, and encouraging academic cooperation and networking similar to 
International Visegrad Fund. However, the existence of the Steering Platform for Research 
in WB has to be mentioned, since it operates and coordinates Research structures in the 
region. Its main objective is to support the enhanced integration of the Western Balkans 
countries in the European Research Area. Moreover the Regional Research Strategy for 
WB has been developed and will be launched at the Ministerial meeting on 4 April in 
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Sarajevo, in co-organization of RCC and the Czech EU presidency. Having this in mind, 
it is still necessary to further needed efforts from relevant EU institutions and the 
respective Ministries in WB countries in order to keep up the momentum and advance 
regional cooperation in this field.
 
• Civil society should be more active in advocating, awareness raising, enhancing but 
also elaborating regional cooperation strategies within each country. For instance, a 
regional inter-parliamentary forum for WB countries may be significantly encouraged 
by Civil Society actors in the region. Such forum may well address key concerns but also 
eventual ‘clashes’ between various regional stakeholders.
• Use the general model of the International Visegrad Fund which gives out grants for 
civil society development on condition of common projects developed by NGOs from at 
least  or ideally all V4 countries to create a Fund to promote civil society cooperation, 
cultural cooperation and reconciliation; 
• Regional cooperation is not given sufficient attention in the discourse and practical 
engagements of any of the political elites in the region. Therefore, an open public debate 
who will increase popular awareness concerning the benefits of regional cooperation 
will stress the political elites of all countries in the region to work together and sketch 
realistic plans of action and cooperation and solve
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